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ABSTRACT 
The demand for “soft power tools” to positively influence stability and security 
has increased interest in Humanitarian Medical Assistance.  Current medical manpower 
determination processes for staffing medical missions are based on the Required 
Operational Capabilities in the Projected Operational Environment.  These platforms are 
designed to support combat casualty, disaster relief, and readiness training.  The current 
manpower process fails to capture country-centric health care requirements associated 
with peacetime missions.  To develop a country-centric approach, a demand-driven 
manpower model was constructed using standard health statistical indicators.  The model 
draws from the statistical indicators to align medical manpower workload to country 
health objectives for delivery at the community level.  The model framework guides 
medical planners in identifying mission essential medical programs and services.  It shifts 
manpower planning from scenario based to country capability and needs assessment; 
which improves alignment to transformational doctrine.  Finally, it creates clarity by 
using actual standard health statistics, thereby fostering prioritization of medical services 
and improved coordination with stakeholders, such as non-governmental organizations.  
It is recommended that a country-centric planning approach be adopted to optimize 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United States and other western nations are pouring billions of dollars into 
aid programs across continents such as Africa, the effects of which are largely unknown.  
While many developing countries continue to make considerable economic, social, and 
political progress, they are not immune from the effects of poverty.  Poverty related 
issues such as chronic corruption, disease, climatic changes, population displacement, 
and regional conflict are destabilizing forces in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).  
These unstable environments have become breeding grounds for terrorist activity and the 
growth of illicit power structures that threaten the economic and strategic and national 
interests of the United States and their partners.  GWOT has refocused attention to the 
importance of instability within these environments and has elevated the importance of 
military humanitarian medical assistance as an influential tool in establishing security and 
stability.  For the United States Navy, this expanded mission builds on a wartime and 
readiness scenario manpower planning processes based on required operational 
capabilities of the projected operational environment.  However, deploying from sea 
based platforms such as the hospital ship is transformational, planning and programming 
needs to flex to improve alignment with strategic doctrine such as the 2006 Quadrennial 
Defense Review, Forward From the Sea, and Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower.  Changing perspective creates opportunities to align to global efforts, cultivate 
partnerships, and improve coordination across government agencies and stakeholders.  
This thesis provides a logical process for evaluating available country data and health 
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The purpose of this research is to develop a scalable model capable of projecting 
humanitarian assistance manpower requirements based on a population’s prevailing 
medical needs, as indicated in select readily available reports and databanks.  Utilization 
of a scalable manpower model not only provides alignment of the mission to manpower 
resources but also improves the delivery of care and builds capacity in the country or 
region of interest.  Medical humanitarian assistance operations are a soft source of 
influence available to combatant commanders in their respective areas of responsibility.  
The capacity to deliver healthcare services for any country is relevant to regional and 
global stability.  Demand-side medical needs assessments drive manpower requirements.  
To increase the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance missions, combatant 
commanders need accurate manpower projections and resource requirements in order to 
scale outreach in the operational area of interest.  Having these projections can influence 
both the decision to integrate medical outreach in humanitarian assistance missions and 
by which venue it is best carried out.  
A. THESIS 
Demand-driven medical manpower models serve to influence combatant 
commanders’ decisions to integrate medical outreach and increase the effectiveness of 
humanitarian assistance missions.  The question explored is, can a demand-driven 
manpower model improve alignment between manpower resources and country need? 
B. RELEVANCE 
This thesis is tied to several contemporary DoD issues relevant to humanitarian 
medical mission planning.  First, the use of military medical assets for humanitarian 
assistance (HA) projects is a means of soft power available to combatant commanders to 
influence security and stability within their area of operation.  Second, historically, 
missions other than disaster relief are based on professional and technological platform 
capability.  Such planning tends to limit the focus of military missions to short-time 
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horizons that occur within a vertically integrated structure.  As such, long-term impact is 
not only difficult to measure but longer lasting outcomes remain unknown.   Third, this 
thesis aligns with existing strategic doctrine such as the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 
Review, Forward from the Sea, and others such as Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower.  Finally, understanding the staffing mix required and operational constraints 
posed by mission medium creates greater flexibility to support global efforts, intra-
agency coordination, and horizontal integration with stakeholders (non-governmental 
organizations (NGO), indigenous military, or healthcare programs).    
In an effort to scientifically frame such complex challenges, this thesis utilizes the 
7 Step Method, developed in the Team Handbook by Oriel to evaluate how a demand-
driven manpower model strategically improves alignment by tying manpower resources 
to country need.  In an effort to guide the focus to large scale medical missions, the 7 
Step Method is incorporated into each section.  The 7 Step Method is similar to Define, 
Measure, Analyze, Improve, and Control (DMAIC), a tool developed under Lean Six 
Sigma.  The 7 Step Method shares DMAIC structure for analyzing complex problems and 
is used to sequentially analyze each step in respect to goal and output found in systematic 
problem solving.  The steps include  
1. “Project: definition of purpose and identify the scope of intention and 
measurements 
2. Current Situation: explanation of background and focused problem statement 
3. Cause Analysis: identify roots of the problem and develop a theory testable 
with data 
4. Solutions: develop, test and implement solution and tested action should 
reduce impact of root causes 
5. Results: use data to evaluate solution and compare pre and post effects  
6. Standardization:  maintain gains by implementing new work methods and 
train in the new method and monitor results   
7. Future Plans: improve upon lessons learned by documenting, communicating, 
and acting on results  (Scholtes, Joiner, & Streibel, 2003).   
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These sequential seven steps serve solely as a logical guide for developing and 
evaluating the power of a demand-driven manpower model.  The first two steps are 
captured in this chapter.  Both the purpose and scope explain why a demand-driven 
manpower model is important. Through this first step, this thesis highlights how such a 
perspective expands awareness for other opportunities for improvement.  The second step 
is presented in the Background section, which provides a basic understanding of the 
problem and the background on the current humanitarian medical assistance 
environment—with a narrowed focus on large-scale humanitarian peacetime missions.  
The third step, presented in Chapter II, develops a means to address the issue of 
delivering humanitarian medical care within the context of country level health 
requirements.  The fourth step is presented in the Methodology found in Chapter III.  The 
model is the recommended tool used to present a possible solution to humanitarian 
medical planners in determining manpower requirements.  The fifth step presents the 
results of the model and is presented in Chapter IV; this chapter presents test results from 
the model using country specific data.  Finally, the sixth and seventh steps present 
opportunities for standardization and are captured in Chapter V.   
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF INTENTION 
The purpose of this research is to develop a scalable manpower model based on a 
population’s prevailing medical needs rather than deployment of the Department of 
Defense (DoD) resources.  The goal is to improve medical mission planning efforts 
through strategic alignment of country health requirements to DoD medical resources and 
to increase awareness of collaborative partners, particularly with existing resource gaps.  
While collaboration is beyond the scope of this paper, it is fundamental to delivering 
humanitarian medical assistance and partnering with the local country communities and 
non-governmental organizations that remain in the area long after the DoD mission is 
completed.  The scope of this thesis is solely confined to the determination of baseline 
medical manpower requirements for large-scale peacetime humanitarian medical 
missions, particularly forward from the sea missions that rely on USNS Mercy (T-AH 19) 
and USNS Comfort (T-AH 20) vessels.  It does not address issues such as cost and 
constraints as it is assumed that any peacetime operation relies on planner identification 
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of core medical services appropriate to the operational environment.  The scope of this 
thesis supports standard data collection processes and future development of measures of 
effectiveness.  It aligns with international efforts and increases mission transparency. 
The power of aligning manpower requirements to country need supports a 
cooperative security climate that facilitates coordination; particularly with other U.S. 
agencies such as the Department of State, USAID/ Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (OFDA), Department of Health and Human Services, and Offices of 
Homeland Defense.  As civil military operations increasingly call for humanitarian 
medical assistance, the role of military medicine will likewise increase.  The issue of 
expansion lies at the heart of this thesis.  Medical manpower planning for large-scale 
DoD peacetime humanitarian medical missions is beyond the traditional scope of 
planning for conventional warfare injuries, post conflict stabilization, and disaster relief 
efforts.  It must flex to transform current approaches that influence combatant 
commanders’ decisions to integrate medical outreach and increases the effectiveness of 
humanitarian assistance missions.   
D. BACKGROUND 
The governments of western nations such as the United States, Great Brittan, and 
France are pouring billions of dollars into aid programs across continents such as Africa.  
The effects of this aid is largely unknown.  While some countries have made considerable 
economic, social, and political progress towards providing a stabile and secure 
environment within their sovereign territorial borders, chronic corruption, disease, 
climatic changes, population displacement, and regional conflict continually destabilize 
the effects of such progress.  In the Global War on Terror (GWOT), unstable 
environments and lawless territories have become breeding grounds for terrorist activity 
and the growth of illicit power structures that threaten the economic and strategic and 
national interests of the United States and their partners.  GWOT has refocused attention 
to the importance of instability within these environments particularly with countries 
such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and, it may be indirectly responsible for 
expanding responsibilities of many diplomatic, political, and humanitarian tasks to the 
military from what has traditionally been a multilateral perspective.   
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In the Global War on Terror, Navy medical peacetime humanitarian medical 
missions deploy primarily from the sea on platforms or vessels referred to the USNS 
Mercy (T-AH 19) and USNS Comfort (T-AH 20).  While there are other naval ships used 
in successful humanitarian assistance operations, they are grey hull vessels that do not 
posses the same symbolic power as the USNS Comfort and Mercy.  Currently, there are 
no shallow draft hospital ships that symbolize good will in the naval fleet.  For the USNS 
Mercy and Comfort missions, the Operational Plan (OPLAN) is used to notionally adjust 
manpower requirements and authorizations for each platform allocated to each vessel 
(Center for Naval Analysis, 1998).  While the Authorized Manning Document captures 
the assigned Required Operational Capability in the Projected Operational Environment 
(ROC/POE) manning is intrinsically tied to technological and professional capability of 
the vessel.  These peacetime operations incorporate the ROC/POE, but are notionally 
adjusted by subject matter experts.  These adjustments are scaled to operational bed 
capacity or platform requirements up to 1,000 beds (Military Sealift Command, 2006)..  
These vessels appropriately support combat casualty care requirements to the U.S. 
Marine Corps and Naval Fleet forces but it is uncertain that these manning requirements 
provide the best support for peacetime humanitarian assistance missions, which 
increasingly rely on civilian partners. 
There are no known readily-available tools for medical mission planners to 
integrate civilian partners into large scale hospital ship peacetime missions.  The lack of 
such assistance, however, is a seemingly normal shadow effect, which formed as a result 
of rapid transformation in the promotion of security and stability.  GWOT presents as a 
boundless battle that challenges traditional concepts of conventional warfare and 
refocuses the importance of otherwise peripheral issues, such as the need for institutional 
capacity and the development of health intervention control programs in vulnerable 
countries.  Such a refocus calls for expanded imagination and innovation in non-kinetic 
approaches to combat terrorism.  Humanitarian missions in the post-September 11 
environment provide valuable insight into developing alternative soft power approaches 
that aid in the prevention of conflict and promotion of stability and support the current 
policy environment. 
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1. Legal Authority: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
The Department of Defense provides humanitarian assistance under Title 10, 
U.S.C. 2561 (Margesson, 2007).  The Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Action 
(OHDACA) appropriation funds three activities: the Humanitarian Assistance Program 
(HAP), the Humanitarian Mine Action Program (HMA), and Foreign Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Response (FDR/ER).  The OHDACA appropriation funds these activities in 
support of the President’s National Security Strategy and the Secretary of Defense 
Security Cooperation Strategy.  The DoD receives an annual appropriation through 
OHDACA for Humanitarian Assistance Programs (HAP) (DoD Security Cooperation 
Agency, 2006).  In 2005, the OHDACA budget increased from 49.4 million set in 2002, 
to approximately 59.6 million, with 39.6 million dedicated to HAP (DoD Security 
Cooperation Agency, 2006, p. 81).  The DoD is authorized to conduct humanitarian civil 
assistance missions under Title 10, U.S.C. 401, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 
Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations (Darrell, 2006).  These programs 
strategically align under Combatant commander cooperative security efforts and may 
include civil engineering, civil governance, explosive ordinance disposal, medical, and 
logistics; however, the scope of this thesis pertains solely with humanitarian medical 
assistance.   
Expansion of humanitarian medical assistance missions in today’s cooperative 
environment calls for an innovated approach to manpower planning.  Medical manpower 
planning based on country healthcare requirements is an incremental step towards 
improving mission effectiveness and global stability and security efforts.  The basis for 
the focus on country healthcare requirements is to develop an understanding of the 
demand for services and to systematically standardize the planning approach.  Such 
standardization is required for improving communication and fostering partnerships, 
requiring consistent data collection, and developing measures of effectiveness (which 
currently do not exist).  This is a move away from casualty manpower estimation models 
that focus on the care of wounded sailors, soldiers, and marines, to what has become an 
increasingly cooperative and transformational environment. As such, a new perspective 
in the way forward is appropriate for medical mission planners as they increasingly 
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support combatant commanders in humanitarian assistance medical interventions.  While 
such interventions fall within the range of options available to combatant commanders, 
the power of HA is only recently understood—as demonstrated by Operation Unified 
Assistance launched in response to the December 26, 2004, tsunami disaster in Southeast 
Asia.        
2. Importance of Health to Security and Stability  
The relationship between chronic and infectious disease to poverty and the 
adverse impact it has on economic development and political stability exacerbates the 
issue of regional security and stability.  The burden of disease has elevated the 
importance of humanitarian assistance in supporting global stability efforts, particularly 
as globalization accelerates consumption of resources, transfer of information, and 
exchanges between people and the environment.  Acceleration of human interactions with 
each other and the current state of the environment are inherently linked to political, 
economic, and social changes (Clunan, 2006)  These changes are also linked to the 
effects of global warming and population density shifts that may challenge global 
stability into the foreseeable future.  Future challenges to country stability are also tied to 
the emergence of new pandemics, population displacement, spread of contagious disease, 
and lifestyle changes that increase the prevalence of communicable and non-
communicable diseases.  As such, the struggle for political, economic, and social stability 
cannot be disaggregated from basic health of the population in developing countries.  
History likewise, cannot be disaggregated.  In many developing countries, periods 
of colonial interference and conflict have resulted in division of populations into ethnic 
clusters resulting from land redistribution programs.  Existence of such factors may place 
the use of humanitarian aid at risk and present destabilization forces due to perceived 
inequities of the distribution of aid (McNeil, Kuehnast, & O'Donnell, 2004).  Medical 
humanitarian aid that exceeds basic health care requirements and global humanitarian 
efforts may complicate the political legitimacy of the country and fracture a host nation’s 
capacity for development on all levels: national, regional, state, and local communities.   
This is critical as growth of illicit power structures (IPS) often arise from a country’s 
inability to provide basic services such as security, health, water, and sanitation (Clunan, 
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2006)  Growth of illicit power structures are often associated with terrorist activity in 
countries suffering from a wide range of issues such as severe poverty, population 
growth, poor governance, slow economic development, and overall lack of institutional 
capacity to support social services.  Such widespread and structurally complex issues to 
these emerging states or regions challenge not only the national interests of the United 
States but also the world.  These macro level issues are beyond the scope of this thesis; 
however, the DoD’s ability to plan manpower to community based health needs supports 
strategic partnering, operational effectiveness, and the promotion of political legitimacy 
for any willing country that desires a prosperous and free democratic society.   
Planning to the country health requirement requires medical humanitarian 
planners to identify basic health requirements and scale the provision of services.  Such 
an approach calls for a basic understanding of the major health programs in place to 
combat general diseases and conditions as well as the domestic health service 
infrastructure.  Such an endeavor is imperative as the evolution of new challenges will 
surely emerge from old challenges in what has become an environment of rapid change.  
No longer can planners rely on reactionary structures and scenarios to plan to an 
operational environment that requires preventive measures to promote stability and 
security.  This thesis advocates the use of medical humanitarian assistance driven by 
country medical needs to holistically improve the effectiveness of efforts by combatant 
commanders. 
E. COMBATANT COMMANDERS 
There are six geographically defined regions of the world: U.S. Central 
Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. North 
Command, U.S. South Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and most recently, U.S. Africa 
Command.1  Each region is represented by a regional combatant commander (combatant 
commander) who  
may function at both the strategic and operational levels in synchronizing 
the applications of all instruments of national power in time, space, and 
                                                 
1 From 2007 Course Materials, NW3275 Joint Maritime Operations - part 1 from  Joint doctrine for 
campaign planning, 2006, published by the Naval War College, Newport, RI 
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purpose with the actions of other military forces, U.S. Government (USG) 
agencies, Non-government Organizations (NGOs), and Private Voluntary 
Organization (PVOs), regional and international organizations, and 
corporations toward theatre strategic objectives. (Naval War College, 
2006)  
 
Humanitarian relief and assistance falls within the range of military operations as a 
Flexible Deterrent Option (FDO) and is consistent with U.S. national security strategy. 
“FDOs are primarily designed to be used in groups that maximize integrated results from 
all the political, informational, economic, and military instruments of national power” 
(Naval War College, 2006, p. A-1).   The combatant commander draws from the Range 
of Operations Military Operations (ROMO) to align, defend, promote, and protect 
national interests, regional stability, and democracy.  Reaction to conflict draws from a 
broad spectrum of available options subject to U.S. foreign and domestic policies 
including the use of nuclear weapons, conventional warfare, and asymmetric warfare 
however, peacetime operations are soft instruments that appropriately align with 
proactive stability and good will efforts.  For developing countries at geo-strategic 
crossroads, combatant commanders may require simultaneous constructive political, 
economic, and humanitarian assistance to deter disruptive behaviors and the development 
of a State hostile to American interests.  While humanitarian assistance is only one aspect 
of confronting complex structural challenges, it is increasingly used as evidenced by the 
recent deployments to Southeast Asia and Latin America.  
Combatant Commands are required to organize, plan, and conduct contingency 
operations within the geographically defined area.  Within each Combatant Command, 
the Command Surgeon advises and coordinates the health planning and operations.  
While DoD does not automatically lead in peacetime operations, it is often the best 
equipped to fulfill the mission.  As such, DoD may be requested to take the lead for the 
duration, initially or intermittently (Clunan, 2006).  These operations are conducted under 
a joint task force (commander) established by the regional combatant commander.  The 
joint task force is a flexible construct based on the mission (Clunan, 2006, p. 43).  As 
such, critical to mission success is understanding the population’s prevailing medical 
needs.  To increase the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance missions, combatant 
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commanders require accurate projections on manpower and resource requirements, as 
well as the scale of feasible outreach in the targeted area of interest; having these 
projections can influence both the decision as to whether medical outreach is integrated 
in humanitarian assistance missions and by which venue it is best carried out. 
Access to information using the Internet expands the scope and volume of 
available data sources for medical mission planners; however, while these data exist, they 
are not easily translated into something useful to the planning process.  Information needs 
to be captured in an easily digestible form that is specific to manpower estimation.  The 
demand-driven medical manpower perspective reduces the mismatch between resources 
so that delivery of care is improved by providing the right skills at the right time.  The 
goal is to integrate medical outreach and increase the effectiveness of humanitarian 
assistance missions. 
With greater emphasis on building the combatant commanders portfolio of 
resources, service departments can expect humanitarian medical operations to increase.  
The service departments each face a unique set of constraints based on the medium of the 
operational platform (deep-water hospital ship, medical and dental civil action project, 
expeditionary medicine, grey hull shallow draft vessel, and fleet hospital).  These known 
constraints impose systemic effects on the mission and remain outside of the scope of this 
thesis.  They are, however, important to manpower planning and the indigenous country’s 
capacity to treat a target population within a range of healthcare requirements.  
Establishing workload baselines and monitoring productivity requires a framework for 
analyzing the required medical resources.  Regardless of the operational platform, 
demand-driven health assessments serve as a bottom-up approach that not only facilitate 
prioritizing but also create visibility for phasing and synchronizing projects across the 
geographically defined regions for each of the respective combatant commanders.   
The demand-driven humanitarian model aligns with capabilities based planning 
by evaluating host nation healthcare requirements.  While previously considered 
peacetime operations, for the combatant commander, the peace may strategically drive 
their future choices.  Such a notion is tied to combatant commanders’ ability to influence 
the environment within their respective region in order to protect American interests.  
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According to John Spinelli, “U.S. military peacetime operations shape the international 
environment by creating, fielding, and sustaining credible forces that can achieve 
multiple purposes: reassure and influence allies, deter adversaries, and influence neutral 
countries” (2008).  He also points to the development of partnerships and the resulting 
powerful relationships that “promote regional stability, increase the security of allies and 
friends, build coalitions, and ensure a more secure global environment” (2008).   HA 
medical operations provide a platform of exchange to test the spectrum of activities that 
better position U.S. forces in understanding their own capabilities and limitations, as well 
as potential weaknesses of allies and, thereby, strategically improving information 
required in response to crises (Spinelli, 2008).  
F. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE 
  Strategic drivers of U.S. force planning and operations align under Executive 
Directives by the President of the United States, the National Security Strategy of the 
United States, the National Military Strategy of the United States, the National Defense 
Strategy of the United States, and the National Maritime Strategy of the United States; 
they are supported by doctrine such as Joint Vision 2020.  These strategic initiatives 
convey the need for cooperation and alliances in order to promote free democratic 
societies, shared values, and shared military and security responsibilities around the 
globe, particularly in emerging states.   The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report (QDR) builds upon what has been a transformational defense agenda that builds 
on the 2001 QDR and the National Defense Strategy, published in 2005.  The 2006 QDR 
is mainly based on the operational experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as a 
myriad of other missions including: humanitarian relief operations in response to the 
tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the earthquake in Pakistan, and hurricane Katrina.  The 
purpose of the 2006 QDR is to support an agile environment capable of adapting to 
asymmetric as well as traditional threats.  Specifically, it identifies four lessons:   
• Having the authorities and resources to build partnership capacity, achieve unite 
of effort, and adopt indirect approaches to act with and through others to defeat 
common enemies—shifting from conducting activities ourselves to enabling 
partners to do more for themselves; 
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• Shifting from responsive actions towards early, preventive measures and 
increasing the speed of action to stop problems from becoming conflicts or crisis; 
• Increasing the freedom of action of the United States and its allies and partners in 
meeting the security challenges of the 21st Century; and, 
• Minimizing costs to the United States while imposing costs on adversaries, in 
particular by sustaining American scientific and technological advantage over 
potential competitors.  (Office of the Secretary of Defense , 2006, p. 2-3)  
 
In accordance with Defense strategy, there are four priorities: 1) defeat terrorist 
networks, 2) defend the homeland in depth, 3) shape choices of countries at strategic 
crossroads, and 4) prevent hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006 p.3).  
Humanitarian medical assistance directly aligns with the third priority as a means to 
positively influence countries at such strategic crossroads and may also indirectly support 
other priorities, which contribute to stability and security efforts in a cooperative 
environment while increasing the potential to forge or expand partnerships.  These four 
priorities point to the need for service departments to shift away from individual stove 
piped programs to develop joint-war fighting portfolios under combatant commanders.  
In 2001, the Department of Defense initiated a shift from “threat-based planning to 
capabilities-based planning,” changing the way war-fighting needs are defined and 
prioritized (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006, p. vi).   The emphasis has shifted to 
the capabilities of the enemy and aligns those capabilities to U.S. resources.  While the 
DoD has a strong history of assessing war-fighting capability, country healthcare 
capability and population health assessments have remained outside the scope of DoD 
activity.  To effectively use the DoD medical assets in large scale peacetime operations 
aimed at “shaping the choices of countries at such strategic crossroads,” medical planners 
must identify basic country healthcare requirements and intervention control programs to 




G. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY 
 The Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense’s Overseas Humanitarian Assistance 
Policy Guidance for Fiscal Year 2008 defines baseline guidance for combatant 
commanders to evaluate the appropriateness of potential projects.  Under this directive, 
combatant commanders are responsible for issuing specific instructions and establishing 
standard operating procedures within their AOR that are consistent with GWOT 
objectives.  Applicable aspects related to humanitarian assistance are divided into two 
sections below; for the full text of the unclassified DoD policy guidance see Appendix A.   
Humanitarian Assistance General Guidance:  
DoD humanitarian assistance (HA) is a significant tool for achieving U.S. 
security objectives and reflects American values.   
 
Important complementary security goals that HA should aim to achieve 
include those of direct benefit to DoD, such as improving DoD visibility, 
access, and influence in a partner nation or region; generating long-term 
positive public relations and goodwill for DoD; and promoting 
interoperability and coalition-building with foreign military and civilian 
counterparts..  Just as important are indirect benefits to USG security 
interests that arise from improving basic living conditions of the civilian 
populace in a country/region susceptible to terrorist/insurgent influence; 
enhancing the legitimacy of the host nation by improving its capacity to 
provide essential services to its populace, including responding to disasters 
and other crises; and building/reinforcing security and sustainable stability 
in a host nation or region.    
HA must complement, but not duplicate or replace, the work of other U.S. 
government agencies (e.g., USAID, department of health and human 
services) or other host nation authorities, international organizations, or 
local or international nongovernmental organizations.  
Partnering: two critical components of security cooperation are 
interoperability and capacity-building.  To foster these goals, HA projects 
must partner with the host nation, and should seek to partner with 
international organizations, other donor nations, local and international 
nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, or third party 
allied/coalition militaries, and USG agencies (e.g., state, USAID, 
agriculture, health and human services) as appropriate, to conduct HA 
projects that benefit the civilian populace and enhance the host 
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government’s ability to provide essential services for its populace.  
Partnering with the host nation military is distinct from directly benefiting 
the military.  In partnering on an HA project, the foreign military would 
work with DoD to benefit the civilian populace directly, thus promoting 
interoperability, capacity-building, and enhancing the image of host nation 
government in the eyes of the local populace.  
 
Strategic communication: two vitally important, but different, audiences 
exist for HA projects.  First, HA projects should send a consistent and 
sustained message to the host nation civilian populace that their 
government is capable of, and willing to, provide essential services to 
them, and/or is capable of responding to crises.  Second, HA projects 
should send a tangible signal within the host nation, regionally and even 
globally, that DoD and the USG  respond to humanitarian needs and have 
an interest in the well-being of those who are in need.  To the extent 
possible, DoD HA efforts should be coordinated with and support to 
broader U.S. public diplomacy efforts.  Projects should be designed to 
generate a sustained positive impact on the civilian population and 
sustained goodwill, not a single photo opportunity, in which strategic 
messages and project intentions could be undermined by lack of follow-
up.     
  
Humanitarian assistance project-specific guidance:  
In addition to advancing U.S. security interests, DoD HA projects must 
also address legitimate humanitarian needs of the targeted population.  
Projects must be designed in coordination with host nation representatives 
and USAID to generate a sustained humanitarian impact. Health projects 
must emphasize public health capacity-building (including improving host 
nation disease surveillance systems).  Health projects must be coordinated 
with the command surgeon’s office, from initial project design through 
execution and follow-up.  
 
Units undertaking medical activities generally must ensure they do not 
significantly exceed the standards of care already provided by the host 
nation.  Providing care that significantly exceeds local standards can have 
a negative effect on the local health care infrastructure once the U.S. HA 
providers have departed.  These effects can range from popular 
expectations of similar care from local health care providers, expected 
return visits by U.S. providers, and lack of sustainability for care provided.  
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Detrimental effects on the civilian population and a potential decline in the 
perception of the USG may occur should any of these effects materialize.   
 
Capacity-building activities involve the transfer of technical knowledge or 
skills to individuals or institutions so that they acquire the long-term, 
independent ability to establish effective policies and deliver competent 
and effective essential services (such as safe drinking water, sanitation 
systems, public health, elementary and secondary education, and 
crisis/disaster response).  Emphasis should be placed on knowledge/skills 
transfer, not simply donation of supplies or equipment.  Examples of 
appropriate projects include the development of host nation organizational 
structures to respond to manmade and natural disasters, the pre-positioning 
of disaster relief supplies, or the establishment of surveillance systems that 
provide an early warning of disease outbreaks. 
 
Participation of U.S. military forces: all HA projects including excess 
property projects should maximize visible U.S. military participation to 
ensure that the projects are effective security cooperation tools.  Active 
DoD participation improves the prospects for developing channels of 
influence and access, potentially provides operational readiness benefits, 
and generates unique training opportunities.  DoD's role must not be 
reduced to only providing funding. (Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense-Health Affairs, 2007).    
 
These guidelines provide an excellent focus for humanitarian projects related to 
enhancing the legitimacy of the host nation.  The ability for a country to improve its 
capacity to provide essential services such as basic healthcare improves its future stability 
and security particularly in times of crisis.  The issue of sustainable stability in a host 
nation or region is often tied to the health of its population.  For medical manpower 
planners, they must determine how to align medical manpower in order to provide 
medical care that has the greatest impact on the overall health and stability of that country 




As web based technologies expand U.S. economic interests across the globe, a 
greater emphasis is placed on improving security and stability within developing 
countries.  There is also greater awareness of the disparities that exist between developing 
countries and industrialized nations.  This brings thousands of humanitarian non-
governmental and private volunteer organizations to the combatant commander’s theatre 
of operations.  These organizations operate a range of development programs that 
influence population health, which is a factor of stability for many countries with fluid 
borders within geographical regions.  With the DoD increasingly called upon for health 
operations, whether post conflict or in response to man-made or environmental 
humanitarian disasters, medical humanitarian assistance operations generally include 
partnering with these inter-governmental agencies, allied militaries, and non-
governmental organizations. Examples of these partners include, the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the Stability Operations office and the 
Joint Staff Surgeon, Department of State, USAID, HHS, and international and non-
governmental organizations such as WHO, UNICEF, UNOCHA, and Doctors without 
Borders.   
DoD’s expansion into civil-military relations expanded into the traditional civilian 
sector as a result of the events of September 11, 2001.  In January 2008, Michael Noonan, 
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) published a report entitled, “Mind the Gap: 
Post-Iraq Civilian-Military Relations.”  The report captures important discussions that 
occurred during the FPRI Program on National Security held in October 2007.  Bernard 
Carreau, senior fellow at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the 
National Defense University and a conference attendee, expanded on the strain occurring 
with the inter-agency process.  He specifically examines the relationship between the 
Departments of State and Defense.  Carreau points to incremental increases in DoD 
civilian sector activity that began with the liberation of Kuwait and continued to grow 
with the DoD involvements in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo.  He defines 
September 11 as the cornerstone of government consensus and that the invasion of Iraq 
elevated the DoD over the State Department.  Since this time, he points to substantial 
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increases in resources for the DoD and little-to-no changes in Department of State 
resources.  He argues that this was not due to changes in foreign policy shift but rather, 
DoD has been more transformational out of necessity to the realities endured in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Noonan, 2008).  Carreau highlights how mal-alignment of inter-agencies 
may undermine operational effectiveness.   
DoD,  State Department,  and  USAID disagreed  on priorities, especially 
on how  to spend  the initial  $18.6 billion in  reconstruction projects  once 
the CPA stood  up with its “dual chain of command between the military 
and the civilian sides.”  DoD  favored  big-budget  infrastructure projects, 
while  Department of State wanted  to focus on governance  and market  
liberalization   and  USAID   wanted  to   focus  on institution- and 
capacity-building. None of these things produced stability. (Noonan, 2008, 
p. 3) 
Michael Noonan’s report also highlights Elizabeth Stanley’s, an assistant 
professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of 
Government at Georgetown University, perspective that there has been an increased 
reliance on what she describes as a “technocentric strategic culture” (Noonan, 2008, p.3).  
The culture, she claims, has become maladaptive due to the way in which technology is 
used to implement grand strategy.  She identifies several symptoms of “cult technology” 
that degrade strategy and mission capability. The symptoms include misallocation of 
resources, poor strategic assessment due to overestimation of capabilities, decreased 
ability to work with allies, increased vulnerability to potential allies, psychological 
insecurity, outsourcing and privatizing security, misunderstanding the nature of networks, 
and the technical bureaucratization of the military profession. “For civil military 
relations, technocentric culture needs to be balanced with a human-centric approach” 
(Noonan, 2008 p.3).  This is of fundamental importance for humanitarian medical 
mission planners as American advances in medical technology often far exceed 
developing country healthcare capacity.  Efforts that surpass basic country capability are 
not compatible for long-run sustainable outcomes and may undermine the efforts of 
NGOs and PVOs who remain in the country long after the HA medical mission ends.  
Stanley supports the argument for greater interoperability, information sharing, and 
overcoming cultural barriers in order for the DoD to maximize operational success; all of 
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which rely on expanded partnership.  It is imperative to improve cooperation and the 
knowledge management base to build a network that supports future operational 
capabilities that may serve to prevent future conflict.  For the respective surgeons and 
medical planners, access to and analysis of accurate and timely population and 
environmental health data are required to align and determine the required medical skill 
mix, personnel quantity, and appropriate medium for delivering healthcare particularly 
when augmenting the mission with NGOs. Horizontal integration and coordination 
required to cultivate partnerships with U.S. government (USG) agencies, NGOs and the 
host nation, while beyond the scope of this paper, are systemically tied to building 
capacity and long-term positive outcomes. 
The demand-driven model is a cultural shift from what is seemingly a 
technologically centric Western medical system.  Incredible advances in Western 
medicine coupled with a strong desire to alleviate unnecessary pain and suffering sets 
medical planning efforts up for staffing the T-AH hospital ship missions—to state of the 
art technological and professional capability rather than country health requirement.  
While the ships are an excellent medium for delivering care, such planning places 
technology and operating capabilities above country requirements; which subsequently, 
creates mission vulnerability to adherence with DoD HA guidance not to exceed the basic 
healthcare requirements of the particular country.  Additionally, DoD missions tend to 
have short time horizons, which creates difficulty in developing measures of 
effectiveness.  Finally, not fully understanding country health programs and control 
initiatives may result in poor staffing mix and partnering; which are exacerbated when 
confronted by operational constraints pointed out in these CNA studies. 
I. ALIGNMENT: MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGS) 
 The largest recorded gathering of world leaders occurred in September 2002 at the 
United Nations (UN) Millennium Summit.  Approximately 189 countries united to 
discuss the state of the world’s poorest nations.  The UN members developed a statement 
of values, principles, and objectives to combat extreme poverty and entitled the document 
the “United Nations Millennium Declaration.”  This declaration outlined eight  
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Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) targeting the eradication of poverty and the 
improvement of living conditions.  The following is an excerpt from the Resolution 
adopted by the General Assembly:  
We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that 
globalization becomes a positive force for all of the world’s people. While 
globalization offers great opportunities, at present its benefits are very 
unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed. We recognize 
that developing countries and countries with economies in transition face 
special difficulties in responding to this central challenge. Thus, only 
through broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future, based upon 
our common humanity in all its diversity, can globalization be made fully 
inclusive and equitable. These efforts must include policies and measures, 
at the global level, which correspond to the needs of developing countries 
and economies in transition and are formulated and implemented with 
their effective participation. (The United Nations General Assembly, 
2000)  
The importance of the General Assembly’s resolution was captured in the creation of 
eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs):  
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger  
• Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar 
a day 
• Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger 
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education  
• Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary 
schooling 
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women  
• Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education 
preferably by 2005 and at all levels by 2015 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality  
• Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health  
• Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio 
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases  
• Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 
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• Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major 
diseases  
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability  
• Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country 
policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources  
• Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access 
to safe drinking water 
• Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 million 
slum dwellers by 2020  
Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development  
• Develop further an open trading and financial system that is rule-
based, predictable and non-discriminatory, includes a commitment 
to good governance, development and poverty reduction—
nationally and internationally 
• Address the least-developed countries' special needs. This includes 
tariff- and quota-free access for their exports; enhanced debt relief 
for heavily indebted poor countries; cancellation of official 
bilateral debt; and more generous official development assistance 
for countries committed to poverty reduction 
• Address the special needs of landlocked and small island 
developing States 
• Deal comprehensively with developing countries' debt problems 
through national and international measures to make debt 
sustainable in the long term 
• In cooperation with the developing countries, develop decent and 
productive work for youth 
• In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to 
affordable essential drugs in developing countries 
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• In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits 
of new technologies—especially information and communications 
technologies (The United Nations General Assembly, 2000) 
 
 These goals unite and align the international community, NGOs, PVOs, and 
multinational corporations under a single cause.  Such alignment has systematically 
concentrated financial resources to develop programs and standardize data collection for 
measuring progress.  With more than a billion people living in impoverished conditions, 
the MDG efforts are ongoing with growing resolve and global commitment within the 
combatant commander area of responsibility.  As such, the door is ajar: together the 
Departments of Defense and State may enter into what is, and has been, a legitimate 
means towards promoting social equity and future operational effectiveness.   All 
organizations are welcome to align with the MDG; therefore, there is tremendous 
opportunity to build partnerships and construct a valuable communication node and 
network framework within a geographically defined area without a large DoD footprint.  
In the participant country’s ongoing projects, the make up of participants include the 
international community, institutions such as the World Bank, agencies such as USAID, 
multinational corporations, and hundreds of private organizations.  However, despite 
being united under the MDG, many ongoing development programs occur independently 
and do not receive the benefits of shared information.  Cultivation of partnerships and 
alliances across these areas may serve to increase the flow of information and facilitate 
collaboration in combating similar population health issues, particularly in dealing with 
population dislocation.  Strong alliances and partnerships demonstrate an improved 
commitment of governance, provide economic investment in people (such as healthcare 
and education) and serve to increase living standards (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2007).   
 The MDG have tremendous influence in decision making for humanitarian 
development programs for major institutions, organizations, and multinational 
corporations.  To embrace the power of such alignment expands the opportunity for the 
combatant commander to softly shape the future environment within the AOR, which 
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may improve operational effectiveness, political legitimacy, and social equity.  The 
MDGs focus development programs based on country needs and draw from major 
institutional participants that have centralized country level data from which standard 
indicators have been developed to create country development profiles.  Such information 
can serve as a guide to DoD medical planners in determining which services and 
development programs to include for humanitarian medical programs.  The indicators are 
particularly valuable to the U.S. Agency for International Assistance and Development in 
the provision of financial grants to non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  For the 
DoD, this is important in understanding the types of programs and participants in the 
theatre of operation and is particularly valuable when coordinating and building on those 
partnerships through USAID. 
J. ALIGNMENT: USAID PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPMENT 
 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is an 
independent federal agency operating under the general guidance of the U.S. Secretary of 
State.  USAID operates in over 100 countries, with 75 field offices, as the lead U.S. 
Federal agency for delivering humanitarian aid and foreign assistance in the developing 
world” (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2008).   USAID was formally 
created through an executive order signed into law in 1961 as part of the Foreign 
Assistance Act.  Its history, however, traces back to the Marshall Plan under President 
Harry S. Truman, as part of reconstruction programs in Europe after World War Two 
(U.S. Agency for International Development, 2008).  USAID lists nine principles that 
guide funding approval for development and reconstruction assistance. These principles 
are fundamental to distribution of assistance grants and serve to align the development 
objectives to economic growth, democracy and governance, and social transition:   The 
nine principles include: 
1. Ownership: Build on the leadership, participation, and 
commitment of a country and its people.  
2. Capacity-Building: Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical 
skills, and promote appropriate policies.  
3. Sustainability: Design programs to ensure their impact endures.  
4. Selectivity: Allocate resources based on need, local commitment, 
and foreign policy interests.  
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5. Assessment: Conduct careful research, adapt best practices, and 
design for local conditions.  
6. Results: Focus resources to achieve clearly defined, measurable 
and strategically-focused objectives.  
7. Partnership: Collaborate closely with governments, communities, 
donors, NGOs, the private sector, international organizations, and 
universities.  
8. Flexibility: Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of 
opportunities, and maximize efficiency.  
9. Accountability: Design accountability and transparency into 
systems and build effective checks and balances to guard against 
corruption. (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2005) 
 
For the DoD, USAID is the principal agency for coordinating humanitarian 
assistance in foreign countries, which horizontally aligns under the National Security 
Council’s Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) process.  It is imperative for the DoD 
medical mission planners to understand USAID’s connection to non-governmental 
organizations within the combatant commanders area of responsibility.  Foreign aid and 
humanitarian development and assistance programs are largely possible for many non-
governmental and private volunteer organizations (NGO/PVO) through corporate 
strategies created by the United States government.  Multi-lateral participation for 
development goals have traditionally been identified as a coordinated effort through 
Department of State, USAID, and other development agencies.  Execution of these goals 
has been carried out through contracts to private and indigenous companies as well as 
through grants to NGO/PVOs.   While there is management and oversight of contract 
work, NGOs carry out the development objectives under their organizational mission.  
The byproduct of these contract and NGO/PVO efforts are generally tied to basic 
assistance programs often associated with poverty and connected to political instability 
and social economic improvements.  NGO/PVO organizations often carry out 
development programs in highly remote areas over extended periods of time.  
NGOs/PVOs traditionally conduct their missions far removed from relationships with any 
military in order to remain a neutral party.  But, in the GWOT this is changing.  DoD 
service departments, Department of State, and U.S. government agencies increasingly 
compete for resources to manage global development programs.  NGOs are often 
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religious and charity based with their own cultural identity and objectives.  They do not 
ideologically align with U.S. foreign policy or military objectives.  From the sociological 
perspective, they are public servants of society whose contributions are through peace 
operations conducted under the auspices of their organizational mission.  From a 
psychological perspective, motivation for volunteer service serves different functions for 
different people that may or may not be self maximizing.  Six identified functions for 
volunteering include: 1) values function, captures concerns for others, 2) understanding 
function, promotes learning and skill practice, 3) career function, serves as stepping stone 
for employment particularly among recent college graduates, 4) social function, captures 
peer pressure and acceptance, 5) protective function, escaping ones own problems, 6) 
esteem enhancement function, enhancing self confidence (Houle et al. p. 388).  There are 
no known volunteer functions that align with U.S. Foreign policy objectives.   
Humanitarian NGOs are often comprised of volunteers that do not consider 
themselves “force multipliers” rather they see themselves as committed to the 
organizational mission which obviously aligns with their individual benefit or utility 
gained from volunteering.  In fact, the individual psychological benefit may be 
undermined if the NGO cooperates with the military as the organizational legitimacy is 
called into question by the violation of what is supposed to be a neutral body without 
government representation.  Moreover, because NGOs remain in developing countries 
long after completion of U.S. military medical missions, they are fearful of how the local 
population will perceive their role in the area. 
On March 5, 2005, in an effort to reduce barriers of cooperation, the U.S. Institute 
for Peace (USIP) facilitated a working group that included representation from the 
Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development.  The culmination of the groups effort was the 
publication by the U.S. Institute for Peace entitled “Guidelines for Relations between 
U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations” published on 
August 7, 2007.  It is unclear however, how this information is circulating within and 
among the service departments as the term “force multiplier” is repeatedly used by senior 
leadership and culturally misunderstood by most boots on the ground.  This is 
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problematic as NGOs, despite the GWOT shift of power to DoD and tie to broader 
strategic doctrine, have no obligation to assist.  In the GWOT, cooperative security 
depends on collaboration across all organizations and allied militaries and as such, 
transparency and clarity of mission intent is critical for reducing barriers and garnering 
cooperation in humanitarian medical missions particularly as the All Volunteer Force is 
increasingly called upon for action. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A comprehensive review of literature and information sources was conducted in 
order to identify critical inputs for developing a medical manpower estimation model that 
aligns to country health requirements.  This review includes information specific to the 
DoD and inter-agencies and also draws from mainstream bodies of research on efforts to 
combat disease and illness in developing countries.  The focus of this section is to draw 
out considerations that add value to the manpower planning process and to assist in 
determining which information is appropriate for inclusion into the model.  Input 
identification is critical as the model merges standard health statistical information with 
military medical workload projections and benchmarks.  The translation of such inputs is 
the estimated manpower requirement that requires additional checks for strategic 
alignment and appropriate notional staffing adjustments in accordance with the literature 
reviewed. 
A. CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS STUDIES 
Several contemporary studies conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis 
humanitarian operations were reviewed in order to understand current manpower 
planning and programming efforts.  The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) is the primary 
publication source for studies pertaining to Navy peacetime humanitarian medical 
missions in the GWOT environment.  These studies enabled a comprehensive review of 
humanitarian medical manpower mission planning with respect to hospital ship 
deployments.  They covered a range of topics including medical operational requirements 
and platform structure, integration of NGOs and allied militaries, an evaluation of factors 
that affect humanitarian deployments from the sea, and linking humanitarian action to 
strategic results.  Several issues emerged from these studies that are not only important to 
the development of a demand side manpower model but the holistic approach in the 




structure for mission execution, identification and prioritization of core medical services, 
the role of volunteers and participation, and understanding the population to leverage 
strategic impact. 
1. Platform Structure and Trade offs 
The issue of trade offs exists in any constrained environment.  As mentioned 
earlier, the hospital ship platforms are structurally and appropriately designed to support 
combat casualty care, disaster relief, and medical training and readiness functions.  These 
state of the art hospital ships are deep-water vessels at 894 feet long, 38.2 foot draft, and 
displacement of 69,360 tons (Military Sealift Command, 2006).  As such, deep-water 
vessels are subject to logistic and transportation trade offs when deploying from the sea.  
CNA studied the driving factors that impact patient workload and type of care provided 
during the 2006 humanitarian mission of USNS Mercy to the Philippines, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, and East Timor and confirms the existence of challenges to providing HA 
from the sea (Strauss, 2007).  While trade offs and corresponding constraints are outside 
the scope of this thesis, they remain important as the model can estimate staffing 
requirements but it is up to the medical manpower planners to determine the appropriate 
mix of medical specialists and support staff in order to maximize the patient workload.   
Understanding the country health control intervention programs and the unmet basic 
health demand transforms current planning processes to optimize medical manpower and 
prioritize core medical services. 
2. Identification and Prioritization of Core Medical Services 
Identification and prioritization of core medical services may alleviate trade offs.   
CNA explored two staffing models based on the current configuration of the ships 
transportation capability and found that the Mercy will “rarely be able to send more than 
150 personnel ashore per day if it remains more than a couple of miles from the shore” 
(Strauss, 2007, p. 35).  In respect to port visits, additional factors such as poor weather, 
water depth, and distance to land are all confounding factors that affect the number of 
staff that can be transited to mission sites.  “In respect to water depth and/or the ability to 
dock determines Mercy’s distance from shore.  This distance significantly affects the 
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number of personnel who can be transported to shore per day, which in turn affects the 
amount of aid the ship can provide” (Strauss, 2007, p. 43).  For these reasons, aligning 
medical manpower assets to basic or core country health requirements effectively 
improves optimization of manpower resources and hospital ship operational efficiency 
and promotes greater flexibility in scaling medical services delivered.  As the study 
indicates, “If the patients’ medical requirements are known, they can be used to estimate 
the number of clinical staff needed to provide the services” (Strauss, 2007, p. 43).  
Aligning to the country health requirement further generates visibility of manpower 
shortfalls and presents the opportunity to target NGO and interagency personnel 
participation. 
3. Volunteer Participation and Mission Integration 
CNA studied USNS Mercy’s trip to Southeast Asia to provide humanitarian 
medical operations in the Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and East Timor.  The 
decision to include virtually anyone who wanted to participate in the mission rendered 
the mission “participation based more on the availability of volunteers than on 
requirements for specialties” (Strauss, 2007, p.11).  This decision became problematic 
because the participants had understandably different motivations for joining the 
partnership.  Participant satisfaction is important to determine whether the Navy achieves 
its objectives in the mission (Strauss, 2007).  Interestingly, the study finds that the 
fluctuations in the number of embarked NGOs and Allies in respect to population served 
by port visit did not necessarily increase the provision of humanitarian relief.  The study 
finds little correlation between the number of embarked personnel and the size of the 
population served.  A lack of correlation between the number of embarked personnel and 
workload created situations in which large numbers of personnel embarked for some of 
the port visits that had relatively low clinical workload requirements.  CNA reported that 
several NGO volunteers voiced frustration as they felt underused, and, by embarking 
large numbers of NGOs and Allied militaries without calibrating staff size to workload, 
there were likely numerous times when the workload was too small to satisfy embarked 
personnel. (Strauss, 2007, p. 23)   
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 From a strategic perspective, the importance of manpower planning requirements 
is critical to preventing diminishing marginal returns.  The addition of one more NGO 
organization and/or participant to the embarked mission may lead to unintended 
consequences of participant dissatisfaction and adversely impact future partnerships.  The 
study exposes how lack of a country health perspective clouds the manpower planning 
process, which is inherently linked to cultivation of partnerships in a cooperative 
environment.  The lack of country health perspective is exemplified by CNA’s  
recommendation “to the degree possible, arrange for NGO and Allied military staffing to 
be increased during the busiest port visits and reduced during the less busy visits” 
(Strauss, 2007, p. 25).  The study further calls for innovative manpower planning efforts 
that explore the use of specific self-contained missions—such as Operation Smile which 
performed reconstructive cleft palate surgeries in Bangladesh.  While outside the scope of 
manpower estimation, the incorporation of NGOs to augment active duty medical 
manpower is powerful and should be holistically evaluated within the projected 
operational environment as the benefits of self-contained operations require no additional 
medical staffing and serve as an excellent “plug and play” addition to any operation.  
Also, incorporating such missions may reduce uncertainty as to the timing and 
specializations required which, otherwise, make “it difficult to predict what staffing 
requirements should be filled by NGOs” (Strauss, 2007, p. 11).   
4. Understanding Target Population and Strategic Impact 
CNA has further explored the role of humanitarian missions using the United 
States Naval Ship (USNS) Mercy the USNS Mercy and Comfort in respect to public 
opinion.  CNA finds that humanitarian missions such as Operation Unified Assistance, 
launched in response to the December 26, 2004, tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia 
indirectly shape public opinion towards the United States.  The studies capture the 
importance of public opinion through polling organizations such a Terror Free Tomorrow 
(an independent non-partisan, not-for-profit organization).  Polling results demonstrate 
that the “Mercy mission was favorably viewed by the vast majority of people who knew 
about it in Bangladesh and Indonesia” (McGrady & Strauss, 2007, p. 32).  The 
implication for U.S. policy makers is that the Hospital ship is a powerful instrument of 
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American Foreign policy “at a time when Indonesian polls indicate that the overall view 
of the United States, and the war on terror, were declining in Indonesia” (McGrady & 
Strauss, 2007, p. 33).  The unprecedented operation served as a turning point for 21st 
century disaster response and demonstrates the powerful potential returns to reputation 
capable of reversing anti-Western attitudes and beliefs.  These potential returns have 
strategic and tactical implications.  From the strategic perspective, meaning is created 
through the use of symbols, which the USNS Mercy represents.  From the tactical 
perspective, the conduct of the operation, such as types and quantity of care provided, 
also impact public attitudes and beliefs.  Two important findings concerning the mission 
and attitudes towards the United States from independent polling in Bangladesh and 
Indonesia are: 
1)  95% of Bangladeshis and 85% of Indonesians viewed the ship and its 
mission favorably  
2) 85% of Bangladeshis and 53% of Indonesians polled stated that the 
hospital ship deployment created a more favorable attitude towards the 
United States (McGrady & Strauss, 2007). 
However, to truly capture the power of humanitarian medical missions, the projected 
operational environment must include basic country health requirements.  Clearly, the 
provision of medical care in the aftermath of a tsunami increases the intensity for desired 
assistance, and while the Mercy ships symbolize compassion and caring by the American 
people, the ability to change attitudes would seemingly be different during peacetime 
situations because the types of illnesses and diseases would not only be different but 
proportionately different. In the disaster setting, services were clearly aligned with the 
country needs and international efforts, which provided significant return on reputation to 
the United States.   
B. CENTER FOR DISASTER AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE  
In February of 2004, the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance 
Medicine (CDHAM), a department within the Department of Emergency Medicine at the 
Uniformed Services University of Health Services (USUHS) conducted a survey of 215 
total U.S. military personnel who participated in humanitarian assistance (HA) projects.  
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This article points to an absence of manpower planning and measures of effectiveness 
from the mission perspective.  The survey finds that, on average, medical providers 
participated in five humanitarian projects but that the majority had no formal training and 
only six of the total 215 respondents had previously worked with non-governmental 
organizations.  A vast majority of participants deployed on the humanitarian mission 
were Individual Augmentees (IA) and only 40% deployed with and led their respective 
unit (Llewellyn & Drifmeyer, 2002).  The widespread use of IAs to fill staffing gaps that 
do not align with country health service requirements may erode unity of effort and 
promote inefficiency and frustration among personnel.  The survey points to what 
appears to be a lack of centralized or standard manpower planning that adversely impacts 
all aspects of the projects, from planning through execution, to completion and follow up.  
The survey results identify several areas of concentration for performance 
improvement to improve mission effectiveness; including, but not limited to: training, 
project scope, unit vs. Individual Augmentee (IA) approach, dedicated manpower, project 
planning and management, expanding type and focus of HA missions.  The increasing 
role of humanitarian medical missions has tested the structural boundaries of DoD 
humanitarian capabilities and limitations and identifies shortfalls of the current planning 
process starting with the fact that, 
most DoD personnel planning projects simply do not contact some of the 
very humanitarian organizations that might be able to provide valuable up-
to-date information on: health needs of the country, other ongoing medical 
humanitarian projects, or similar information that would potentially 
readily allow DoD projects to be much more effective .... These other-than 
DoD contacts and participants could prove to be tremendous resource 
multipliers, greatly increasing the effectiveness of DoD humanitarian 
assistance with minimal costs. (Llewellyn & Drifmeyer, 2002, p. 5)   
 
The CDHAM survey reveals how an “inward, DoD-centric focus” creates systematic 
limitations that prevent humanitarian assistance projects from realizing optimality 
because the projects are fundamentally and structurally flawed from the outset (Llewellyn 
& Drifmeyer, 2002, p. 4).  “The narrow focus of DoD and the lack of coordination with 
either host nation or other-than-DoD humanitarian organizations may explain, at least in 
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part, the claim of some PVOs and NGOs that the military often does more harm than 
good in some humanitarian assistance operations, or that the military should not even be 
involved in international humanitarian relief” (Llewellyn & Drifmeyer, 2002, p. 6).   
This survey supports the need for development of a manpower estimation model 
that transforms to an environment that increasingly relies on greater communication and 
integration of NGOs and PVOs.  Under the current medical planning structure further 
alignment may not be possible.  Notional staffing adjustments remain tied to the required 
operational capability of the hospital ship, therefore, it fails to incorporate host nation 
medical requirements, international efforts, and U.S. military and political doctrine such 
as the Quadrennial Defense Review and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
(OASD) operational guidance.  It is not unprecedented for the issues of foreign aid and 
assistance to be politically debated in respect to legitimacy, social equity, and military 
effectiveness particularly during periods of economic downturns. 
The defeat of the 1971 bill represented the first time that either House had 
rejected a foreign aid authorization since the program was first initiated as 
the Marshall Plan after World War II. Several themes merged to cause the 
defeat of the bill: (1) opposition to the Vietnam War, (2) concern that aid 
was too concerned with short-term military considerations, and (3) 
concern that aid, particularly development aid, was a giveaway program 
producing few foreign policy results for the United States. Attempts to 
reform the foreign assistance program -- particularly the economic 
assistance program -- were led by the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. Assistance for the poorest sectors of developing nations ("basic 
human needs") became the central thrust of the reform. To extend 
assistance directly to the recipient nation's population, Congress replaced 
the old categories of technical assistance grants and development loans 
with new functional categories aimed at specific problems such as 
agriculture, family planning, and education. The aim of bilateral 
development aid was to concentrate on sharing American technical 
expertise and commodities to meet development problems, rather than 
relying on large-scale transfers of money and capital goods, or financing 
of infrastructure. The structure of the FAA remains today pretty much the 
way it was following these 1973 amendments. (U.S. Agency for 
International Development, History, 2008)  
 
Continued mission execution based on combat casualty and bed capacity requirements 
may subject future missions to legislative political agendas.  In addition, opposition to the 
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war in Iraq, lack of measurable objectives, and sustainability mirror historic events of the 
early 1970s, when the Senate rejected the authorization for funding foreign assistance 
during fiscal years 1972 and 1973.  
C. DISEASE SURVEILLANCE AND GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE   
Tracking diseases has been ongoing for centuries, but the measure of the burden 
of disease upon a community, country, region, or larger global community is recent and 
still evolving.  Health statistics are the foundation for any demand driven humanitarian 
assistance and staffing models.  A first of its kind, the Global Burden of Disease and 
Injury Series was initiated in response to what has largely been a lack of reliable health 
information and comprehensive health statistics.  Global Burden of Disease and Injury 
Series Volume II: Global Health Statistics A Compendium of Incidence, Prevalence and 
Mortality Estimates for over 200 Conditions utilized a consistent approach to assess the 
aggregate disease burden based on major conditions and risk factors on both a country 
and regional level using Disability-Adjusted Life Year or DALY measures.  While this 
thesis does not incorporate the DALY into the manpower model, it is important to frame 
the issue of disease burden to focus the DoD on basic humanitarian health requirements.  
This study identifies healthcare needs as primary care; child survival, and safe 
motherhood; vaccination; breastfeeding and other prevention and treatment of diarrhea 
and respiratory diseases; tuberculosis control; and the control of avoidable causes of 
cardiovascular disease (p. 14).  Understanding the burden of disease from the country 
perspective may be enhanced by using a multidisciplinary approach that draws 
experience from physicians, disease specialists, epidemiologist, anthropologist, 
economist, and policy makers. 
 The study advocates a multidisciplinary approach for combating disease and the 
associated burdens on any country.  The study offers several relevant decision process 
suggestions that may influence how medical planners can prioritize indicators, 
particularly when dealing with countries with a great deal of need.   The first deals with 
the “Identification of national control priorities” (Murray, 1996, p.8).  The study points to 
the fact that many countries have at a minimum a short list of health interventions as “an 
explicit priority for national and political administrative attention” (Murray, 1996. p.8).   
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Examples of these national priorities include interventions, such as the control of HIV, 
tuberculosis, and poliomyelitis, as well as smoking cessation and nutritional deficiencies.  
A second consideration from the Study is that allocating training time for clinical and 
public health practitioners for many educational institutions is fixed and may not occur 
where the burden of disease is high or where program interventions exist.  As such, 
aligning U.S. educational efforts to existing disease treatment programs may 
incrementally improve capacity over time in areas with greatest need.  A third 
consideration pertains to allocation of resources in respect to the magnitude of the burden 
of disease to a region.  Estimation of the amount of workload required becomes essential 
to policy decision making.  Therefore, “information on disease or risk factor burden is 
one (of several) vital inputs to development resource allocation.”(Murray, 1996. p.8).  
We recommend using this study to assist in defining mission objectives for humanitarian 
assistance. 
D. SELECTING HEALTH INDICATORS 
 DoD humanitarian health data are currently collected by patient encounter and 
aggregated under broad categories of International Classification of Disease at the 9th 
series level (ICD-9).  There is no published evidence of DoD humanitarian medical 
effectiveness benchmarks which elevates the importance of information sharing and the 
need for a consistent approach to humanitarian manpower medical planning.  As with any 
human capital strategy, identification of the unmet need drives the work requirement.  To 
adequately estimate DoD staffing, it must first identify the unmet need in order to 
determine the type of medical professional services required.  While the population 
health needs may appear so vast that any assistance is preferred in the absence of 
assistance, the researchers could find no evidence to support such claim.  In fact, review 
of the World Health Organization’s staffing process, suggests that using a rational 
process for estimating staffing based on population ratios per 1,000 is sufficient for 
planning to broad health issues within a developing country.  However, estimation should 
account for variation within a population by location and the corresponding health service 
institutional capacity as these factors contribute to the demand for health services by 
geographical area.  (World Health Oganization/HRB/98.2, p5)  To appropriately assess 
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variation, consistent data collection and measurement approaches can be adopted using 
standard statistical health measures and data collection tools such as the demographic 
health survey.   
E. MEASURE DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEY  
The MEASURE Demographic and Health Survey Program (DHS) was 
implemented by the United Nations in 1984.  Over the course of the last twenty five 
years, more than 220 surveys in 75 countries have been completed from Latin America to 
Asia (Measure DHS, 2008).  The DHS survey provides a consistent medium for 
collecting data for comparative purposes over time.  To date, it is one of the most 
comprehensive tools available for population health demographic assessment.  The 
survey requires host nation participation and aims to improve consistency of collection 
and use of data for monitoring programs and improved policy decisions.   MEASURE 
DHS survey results are compiled into national reports and standard health statistical 
indicators used by many major organizations and institutions such as the World Bank, 
World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations International Children's 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF).  
Development of standard lists of statistical indicators is required to ascertain 
country health issues that scale to a population.  In order to construct such a list, 
understanding the information source and how that information is filtered by major 
organizations and institutions is important.  DHS surveys are also used to compile 
country health reports that provide humanitarian medical planners with a country 
perspective about their own health challenges and ongoing programs to meet them.  This 
literature review includes a review of the following major organizations and institutions 
that provide readily available standard statistical information.  They include, the World 
Bank Institute, World Health Organizations and corresponding databases which include 
HNPstats (HNP) and the WHO Statistical Information System (WHOSIS), and the 
United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF).  In order to identify which 
statistical indicators should be incorporated into the model in respect to DoD 
humanitarian medical manpower mission planning, a mapping exercise was conducted 
and is attached as Appendix B.  Appendix B illustrates all the various indicators, 
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databases, and organizations that were reviewed in conjunction with this thesis.  
Understanding the data collection sources and general flow of information between major 
organizations and institutions was important in reviewing statistical indicators for 
inclusion into the manpower model.  The following provides a brief oversight of these 
institutions and organizations. 
1. The World Bank   
  The World Bank publishes statistical data and provides country level reports that 
serve as the foundation for many policy and program decisions.  The World Bank 
provides country statistical information to end user clients seeking to improve capacity of 
member countries.  Data quality is critical for the establishment of baselines, monitoring 
progress, and evaluating goal attainment as well as the impact of programs or activities. 
Quality data requires consistent collection and agreement on the most widely used data 
indicators.  The World Bank has taken the lead to provide such data as it frequently 
sponsors projects that align with good government policy and assessment of government 
performance in respect to development processes.  Key demographic development 
indicators were developed and are available for five-year periods for specific countries, 
an example is provided using Kenya country information in Table 1.  HNPStats, a high 
powered health sector data mining division of the World Bank, meets the growing 
demand for timely and accurate statistical data as development strategies include metrics 
for monitoring effectiveness particularly, in relation to success of the MDGs.  HNPStats 
database, was designed to centralize health, nutrition, and population statistical 
information and serve as the single “hub” of information flows to “client countries, 
World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations International Children's Emergency 
Fund (UNICEF), Food and Agricultural Organization of United Nations (FAO), United 
Nations Population Division, United Nations Statistics Division, United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)” (The World Bank Institute, 2008). HNP also collects “thematic 
data” which are compiled from survey data on population dynamics, nutrition, 
reproductive health, health financing, medical resources and usage, immunization, 




Table 1.   Key Demographic Development Indicators [Kenya Country Data:  World 
Bank Institute, 2008] 
 
2. The World Health Organization 
The World Health Organization (WHO) classifies and captures information on 
morbidity and mortality statistics using the International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD). The ICD codes are used to classify 
diseases based on the presence of a wide range of visible symptoms and complaints, 
social circumstances, and external causes of injuries and diseases. “Every health 
condition can be assigned to a unique category and given a code up to six characters long.  
Such categories can include a set of similar diseases and provides a detailed description 
of disease and injury” (World Health Organization, World Health Organization, History 
of the Development of the ICD, 2008).  The ICD code history dates back to the 1850 
when the first edition was published.  In 1893, the International List of Causes of Death 
was adopted by the International Statistical Institute.  At this time, the WHO assumed 
responsibility for maintaining the list of causes for death until 1948 when it published the 
6th edition under the title ICD (World Health Organization).  The ICD publication added 
causes of morbidity to what has been an ongoing series that is now in its tenth edition, 
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ICD-10.  The Military Health System has not yet adopted the ICD-10 and this thesis 
draws from 2008, ICD-9 series.  These codes are integral to classifying disease and injury 
data gleaned from inpatient and outpatient patient health records.  The importance of 
these ICD codes lies in the standardization of the collection and analysis of morbidity and 
mortality statistics.   
The ICD has become the international standard diagnostic classification 
for all general epidemiological and many health management purposes. 
These include the analysis of the general health situation of population 
groups and monitoring of the incidence and prevalence of diseases and 
other health problems in relation to other variables such as the 
characteristics and circumstances of the individuals affected. (World 
Health Organization, History of the Development of the ICD, 2008) 
    
The WHO Statistical Information System (WHOSIS) offers timely and 
comprehensive health data on all of the 193 participating WHO members.  WHO has 
established an Internet database publishing a variety of country specific information 
pertinent to effective medical mission planning, particularly for selecting which basic 
health services to target for humanitarian intervention.  The WHO identifies 50 core 
health indicators for monitoring global health and is organized into six categories: 
mortality and burden of disease, health service coverage, risk factors, health system 
inputs, differentials in health outcome and coverage, as well as basic socio-demographic 
statistics that are published annually in the spring.  Such information may be scaled to 
provide a regional perspective on mortality and burden of disease.  There are disease- 
specific data on HIV, malaria, tuberculosis, polio etc., as well as environmental lifestyle 
risk factors in respect to alcohol consumption, immunizations, nutrition, tobacco, and 
water and sanitation.  Table 2 describes the categories of consistently collected 
information available to any interested organization or party. 
All of these categories provide information necessary to understand the 
complexities associated with providing humanitarian healthcare interventions.  The 
burden of disease in respect to morbidity and mortality, in addition to the country’s 
technological, financial, and human resource capacity to control these burdens, are often 
found in the Country Cooperation Strategy (CCS).  Each country conducts a strategic 
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assessment of its health status and identifies health concerns and efforts in the CCS.  For 
the combatant commander, the CCS may be of particular interest as country initiatives 
may be compiled into a regional profile.  Each participating country prepares its own 
CCS, as it is ultimately responsible for development success.   
This bottom-up approach defines country objectives, healthcare priorities, and 
control interventions.  Alignment to these objectives and priorities legitimizes the 
national government’s health programs and focuses DoD delivery of humanitarian 
medical care to community-based basic health service.  Such alignment ties country 
objectives to international efforts and provides DoD an opportunity to collaborate with 
NGOs and PVOs to bridge health service gaps that build health capacity and 
sustainability.  The CCS defines health priorities that shape national health policies and 
strategies for medical planners and should serve as a guiding document to prioritize 
humanitarian health services and the required manpower staffing to execute the mission.  
Such a powerful alignment generates leverage in fighting communicable and non-
communicable disease and expands opportunities for participation that all lead to 
improving the health capacity of the country, as previously identified in the Global 
Burden of Disease.  Therefore, we recommend that this information be used in the 




Table 2.   Categories of Collected Information [After Ref.  World Health Organization, 
2008 ] 
 
3. UNICEF: “Milkman to the World” 
UNICEF was formally created on December 11, 1947, by unanimous vote of the 
first United Nations, General Assembly.  The UN created UNICEF as a short-term 
humanitarian relief measure to provide food, medicine, and clothing to children living in 
war-torn Europe at the end of World War II (WWII).  Within the first five years, 
UNICEF activity spread to more than 100 countries and at the height of activity in 
Europe provided over six million daily meals with milk, thereby earning the nickname 
“Milkman to the World.”  UNICEF continues as a voluntarily funded organization with 
37 national committees, of which, the United States is the oldest (UNICEF, 2008).  
UNICEF plays an integral role in the global effort to lift the burden of poverty and 
disease from children.  Its concentrated efforts serve to protect and improve the lives of 
children and confront diseases such as leprosy, trachoma, malaria, tuberculosis, and 
hunger; all of which stifle country development and sow the seeds of instability.  
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UNICEF filters WHOSIS data and publishes child health indicator statistics on issues 
such as maternal child health, mortality, pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria, immunizations, 
education, and health systems support services. 
UNICEF assesses the state of child survival and primary health care for 
mothers, newborns and children today. These issues serve as sensitive 
barometers of a country’s development and wellbeing and as evidence of 
its priorities and values. Investing in the health of children and their 
mothers is a human rights imperative and one of the surest ways for a 
country to set its course towards a better future. (UNICEF, 2008 
http://www.unicef.org/sowc08/report/report.php) 
 
The collection and publication of child health information provides valuable insight into 
the health profile for children in developing countries.  This standard statistical data and 
information may be utilized in developing the demand driven manpower estimation 
model.  
F. GLOBAL SOURCES & HEALTH INDICATORS  
 Organizations and institutions such as the United Nations, World Health 
Organization, World Bank, UNICEF, and USAID through the Demographic Health 
Survey Measure, provide key country descriptive statistics and publish over 200 
indicators.  Individual review of each indicator is required to construct the list of basic 
health indicators that forms the basis for the demand-driven health care model.  The 
indicators serve as the critical link between disease and potential unmet demand for 
healthcare within a particular country.  Because many of these indicators are tied to MDG 
progress, a series of status questions on the country status towards MDG progress has 
been incorporated into the model.  With respect to MDGs, the following determinations 
were made:  UNICEF has been appointed the central information repository and MDG 
monitoring agent for child health, the World Bank Institute for economic development, 
and WHO for eradication of diseases associated with poverty.  For the demand-driven 
manpower model, the following MDGs were identified as fundamental to influencing the 
type of humanitarian medical care for a developing country: Goal 1: Eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger, Goal 4: Reduce child mortality, Goal 5: Improve maternal health, 
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Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.  Additionally, Goal 7: Ensure 
environmental sustainability and, Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development, 
were identified as indirectly related to policy and development programs that would most 
likely involve greater reliance for DoD partnership with USAID.   As the international 
community aligns financial and organizational efforts under the MDGs, the importance of 
measuring impact of development and health programs has resulted in international 
recognition of statistical indicators.  The indicators by organizations are listed in 
Appendix B. 
 In conclusion, standard statistical information flows freely among major 
organizations and institutions and is often filtered to support many health, economic, 
financial, and political endeavors by global partners.  This information can be utilized by 
medical manpower planners to develop an estimated demand for medical services.  
Country medical demand can used to evaluate the proportionate staffing requirements 
within a given population scale.  Such a perspective drives transformation to meeting 
peacetime humanitarian medical operations and fosters the environment for cooperation. 
G. MANPOWER ESTIMATION 
Developing a composite understanding of healthcare demand for a developing 
country is the first step to deriving a workload requirement for a given population.  Once 
demand for health services is known, it can be converted to standard units of measure.  In 
the model, estimating standard demand is the first step to manpower determination using 
the World Health Organization staffing ratios per 1,000 people when planning to the 
broad population healthcare requirement.  The second step uses medical manpower 
staffing projections based on productivity or industry benchmarks to translate demand 
into medical manpower requirements.  The following sections present a review of 
alternative approaches to measuring productivity that were considered in developing a 
demand driven manpower model. 
1. The Sphere Project 
The following review of the Sphere Project offers perspective on manpower 
determination and planning in developing countries.  The Sphere project was 
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implemented in 1997 by NGOs performing humanitarian assistance throughout the 
world.  NGOs such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent led the collaborative effort—
drawing from the spectrum of participants to establish a Humanitarian Charter and 
Minimum Standards for delivering humanitarian disaster relief.  Today Sphere 
membership unites NGOs under a humanitarian assistance framework that promotes 
organizational transparency and operational effectiveness in six key areas: water supply 
and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter, health services, and security.  While disaster 
assistance is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important for the DoD to understand the 
cultural alignment of NGOs and their accountability to meet established indicators 
published in the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response 
(The Sphere Project, 2000).  Sphere continually develops and publishes health standards 
and measures of impact to improve field performance. 
The cornerstone of the handbook is the Humanitarian Charter, which is 
based on the principles and provisions of international humanitarian law, 
international human rights law, refugee law and the Code of Conduct for 
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non- 
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief. The Charter 
describes the core principles that govern humanitarian action and reasserts 
the right of populations affected by disaster, whether natural or man-made 
(including armed conflict), to protection and assistance. It also reasserts 
the right of disaster-affected populations to life with dignity. The Charter 
points out the legal responsibilities of states and warring parties to 
guarantee the right to protection and assistance. When the relevant 
authorities are unable and/or unwilling to fulfill their responsibilities, they 
are obliged to allow humanitarian organizations to provide humanitarian 
assistance and protection. The Sphere Project, 2000 p.5)  
 
Sphere is a powerful resource available to DoD medical planners, as it has a 
network potential of more than 80 organizations operating in over 400 countries.  Sphere 
shares valuable information regarding morbidity and mortality rates associated with 
communicable diseases during humanitarian disasters.  Sphere points out that disasters 
occurring in developing countries witnessed an increase of 60% to 90% in deaths 
attributed to one of four major infectious causes following a disaster: measles, diarrhea, 
acute respiratory infections and malaria (p. 273).  Sphere also identifies preventable 
diseases such as malnutrition, yellow fever, viral hepatitis and typhoid, which children 
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are very vulnerable.  Sphere defines two primary goals for humanitarian responders.  
First, prevention and reduction of mortality and morbidity, and second, efforts promote a 
return to normalcy for the area.   For the DoD, understanding community health risks, 
resources, and capacity, in respect to environmentally destabilizing events such as 
disaster, may prioritize medical services provided during peacetime humanitarian 
operations. 
According to Sphere’s Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster 
Response published in 2006, “priority public health interventions are designed to ensure 
that the greatest health benefit is provided to the greatest number of people” (p.254 ).  As 
such, DoD humanitarian medical care should align with control interventions that are 
premised on evidence-based practice in which a demonstrated public health benefit to the 
largest audience is preferred.  Sphere identifies these humanitarian interventions as 
adequate quantities of safe water, sanitation, nutritional services, food aid/food security, 
shelter and basic clinical care; and preventive and clinical services aim to control diseases 
of epidemic potential (p. 16).  Sphere marries Minimum Standards, such as “People have 
access to information and services designed to prevent communicable diseases contribute 
significantly to excess morbidity and mortality” to a specific prevention indicator, such as 
a mass measles vaccination campaign and Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) 
(p.274-275 ).  Sphere Project guidance is very insightful and provides a range of options 
for medical staffing to programs such as, vaccinations, vitamin administration, and health 
facilities.  It also stresses the importance of ensuring the presence of female health 
workers. 
 Sphere provides minimum staffing standards that may be utilized in to assess 
health system medical manpower capacity and distribution of services by population.  
These standards are based on level of care and population and list both the key indicators 
and the staffing figures, see Table 3.  An example of the application of these standards is 
a gap analysis conducted by the WHO in conjunction with Sudanese health experts in 
Greater Darfur.  The Gap Analysis Report for Greater Darfur provides insight into 
medical staff utilization and how corresponding staffing resources are distributed by 
locality (Malik et al. 2005).  The study defines main indicators and their standard figures 
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for staffing resources for the Darfur, Primary Health Care (PHC) system.  These 
indicators were used to calculate a baseline medical staffing requirement.  For example, 
at the Community service level, staffing starts at a population of 500 to 1000.  While this 
calculation is not used in the model, it is a logical example of scaling medical staffing to 
population need.  This calculation is used to derive the standard staffing figure for the 
specific indicators within this level.  For example, 
Standard figure = (standard indicator * total population)/population served 
For example:  
standard figure of home visitors = ((1 home visitor) * 401,693)/750,  
(750 = average per 500 to 1000 people) (Malik et al. 2005) 
 
At the peripheral health facility level servicing approximately 10,000 people, the 
consultations per clinician per day = ((Total consultations/FTE equivalent in health 
facility)/ no. of days health facility open per week).  At this level, WHO estimates, 1 
health worker is required for one clinician per 50 consultations per day; as such, 7 health 
workers are required per week to cover 350 consultations.  To determine the gap, WHO 
estimates the difference between actual number and the standard figure of health workers 
per week, which equals the number of health clinics per 10,000 population * 7 days.  At 
the central health facility level, 5 qualified health workers are required and the facility is 
open 7 days. Thus, 35 health workers are required per health center per week.  To 
determine the gap, WHO estimates the standard figure of health workers per week = 
((Total no. of population / 50,000) * 35).  The WHO demonstrates how the Sphere 
methodology can be used to develop universal minimum medical staffing standards that 
may aid decision making in site determination, education, and training efforts 
(Wurthwein, Gbangou, Sauerborn, & Schmidt, 2001).  In respect to staffing reviewed in 
the CNA studies, the medical staffing requirements are significantly higher for staffing 
the hospital ships for deployments from the sea.  This appears to be the case because the 
hospital ship planning structure is premised on combat and disaster related injuries rather 
than illnesses associated with poverty during peacetime. 
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Table 3.   [From Ref. Source:  Sphere Standard Figures of the key indicators of staffing 
resources, HISU, WHO, 2005 ] 
2. Federal Efforts to Measure Productivity 
The U.S. Department for Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) is an outgrowth of Medicare and Medicaid programs that were 
signed into law on July 30, 1965, by President Lyndon B. Johnson (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, History, 2008). These programs have developed over time to 
become the standard in measuring medical workload for provider billing and 
reimbursement.  The importance of the CMS workload measurement efforts is the 
adoption of these standards by the Military Health System (MHS).  On March 6, 2000, 
The Department for Health Affairs (HA) signed into effect Policy 00-001, laying a 
cornerstone for standardizing military health system productivity.  HA Policy 00-001 
initiated optimization efforts across the MHS to increase the provision of direct primary 
care healthcare within the Military Treatment Facility (MTF) by re-engineering primary 
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care enrollment capacity (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, 2006).  The 
policy is fundamental to the development of knowledge management information 
systems, common language for productivity for all services, and a standardized 
measurement approach for managing MTF capacity—and more importantly for this 
thesis, physician productivity.   The Department of Health Affairs provided a model for 
each MTF to determine baseline enrollment capacity per primary healthcare manager or 
provider, which resulted in a ratio of enrollees to provider subject to four demographic 
factors: demand, productivity, availability, and readiness considerations.  The basic 
calculation is: 
Enrollees/Provider = Weeks Worked/Year x Clinical Hours/Week x Visits/Hour  
Annual Visits/Enrollee  
 
This calculation is not meant to marginalize other factors that influence enrollment 
capacity and productivity; rather, it is the first step evaluating how the following impact 
the delivery of care.  The scope and complexity of practice, direct support staff, number 
and availability of exam rooms per provider, clinical support tools, business support 
tools, information management, demand management tools, and demographic factors are 
all confounding factors.  These factors not only influence the number of visits per 
beneficiary per year but also the number of visits per hour (Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Health Affairs, 2006). 
 These factors influence the variation across the service departments within the 
MHS and set the expectation that approximately 1500 beneficiaries are enrolled per 
primary care provider, who is supported by 3 to 3.5 clinical support staff, within two 
dedicated examination rooms; therefore, each provider sees approximately 3.5 patients 
per hour or 25 patients per day (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, 2006).  
For Navy Medicine, optimization of medical services incorporates business principles 
and guidelines to produce quality, evidence based medicine, data quality metrics and 
processes.  Other Federal departments such as the Department for Veteran’s Affairs have 
created similar evidence based on productivity models. 
Federal Department for Veterans Affairs (VA) was tasked by the Undersecretary 
of Health to develop physician productivity staffing models.  There were four medical 
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focus areas: primary care, cardiology, urology, and eye care.  While primary care 
comprised the greatest share of workload productivity and staffing, it lacked a 
standardized approach for evaluating staffing in respect to consumption of resources.  
The VA model uses a managed care approach and empanels beneficiaries to salaried 
providers on a per member, per month basis.  The Report of the Primary Subcommittee 
evaluates VA primary care staffing in order to set productivity measures that promote 
physician management of patient services within a given panel, which is balanced against 
industry benchmarks for patient access to care standards. 
As with the Sphere staffing standards, the VA and DoD service department (e.g., 
the United States Army Medical Command) seek to establish minimum staffing 
standards.  As with the VA, the Army’s MEDCOM Manpower division was also tasked 
to develop a model based on the amount of work hours per physician and the average 
number of visits by a patient population to estimate workload per provider and required 
staffing (p. 4).  The Army’s also relies on RVUs to develop standards for primary care.  
For a primary care, the standard staffing is one physician per 1,178 population with 2.8 
full time equivalents (FTE) support staff operating two exam rooms, which is age 
adjusted based on population composition for patients empanelled over the age of 65.  
The point is government regulation and quality conscious health organizations have 
driven data collection effort on provider productivity to formulate best practices and 
publish benchmarks.  These benchmarks can be utilized to determine medical manpower 
requirements when the demand for health care services is known.  The fact that standard 
workload is tied to the very same ICD framework for classification of disease is not by 
coincidence. 
 The ICD-9/10 codes, as mentioned previously, provide the diagnosis which can 
be further disaggregated based on productivity data due to standard practices observed for 
data collection in the Federal health service departments.  These data collection efforts 
allow for broader perspective beyond descriptive statistics of ICD-9s and categorizing 
disease to capture the workload intensity required to treat disease.  To create greater 
transparency, coding beyond ICD-9/10s is required.  Relative Value Units were created 
by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to capture the relative intensity 
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of resources utilized during the provision of healthcare in the treatment of diseases and 
conditions.  RVUs are numerical estimates aggregated from primarily two parts: Current 
Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes and Evaluation and Management (E&M) codes.  
The RVU values serve as a means to trend and track provider workload within a specific 
disease or health condition category used primarily for financial billing and 
compensation.   
For Navy Medicine, tracking workload and clinical productivity is based on the 
Relative Value Unit (RVU) which captures clinical skills, clinical time, and resources 
required to provide medical care.  RVUs represent the gold standard for measuring 
physician medical workload and are discussed in greater detail below.  Current policy is 
based on Navy Medicine Business Planning Guidelines that relies on the RVU to develop 
benchmarks, thresholds, and support staffing.  See FY09 Navy Medicine Production 
Thresholds and Productivity Benchmarks, attached as Appendix C.   
The CMS RVU is comprised of three aspects, work, supplies expense, and 
malpractice;  the DoD Military Health System (MHS), however, only utilizes the work 
portion to measure productivity.  Work is defined by the amount of time and effort 
required to treat a patient and is indicated by the CPT and E&M codes mentioned above.  
The MHS captures all patient encounter data in the M-2 data-repository and reports RVU 
in a variety of ways.  M-2 is a data warehouse that captures all patient health care 
information within the military health care system.  This thesis uses the simple RVU 
which is the sum of all CPT codes for a given patient record.  An example from the 
Federal Service Optometry Coding Guide v 2.0:   
A new patient is seen for an annual exam in the optometry clinic – the doctor 
performs a comprehensive eye exam, a refraction, and fits/orders 
spectacles. The following CPT-4 Codes were recorded:  
 
CPT 92004 – Comprehensive Eye Exam (1.67), CPT 92015 - Refraction (0.38), 
and CPT 92340 – Monofocal spectacles fit/order (0.37); therefore, 
  
The total RVU workload intensity = 1.67+0.38+0.37 = 2.42 RVU. (U.S. Army 
Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine website, 2007) 
 
 51
For the MHS, the Army and Navy Medical Commands have establish benchmarks for 
monitoring care and meeting industry standards and accreditation compliance with 
organizations such as the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations.   
Only within the last several years has the DoD embarked on large-scale peacetime 
humanitarian medical assistance efforts.  As such, data collection largely occurs at the 
ICD-9 level as encounter data that is rolled under large categories of care.  For an 
example of this data, see Table 4.  Unfortunately, existing data has only captured the 
ICD-9 category and falls short of capturing even the basic ICD-9 code.  Lack of data 
quality and accurate capture of codes prevents analysis of previous HA missions because 
it does not capture the detail of the work performed by medical providers in the field.  
ICD-9 level coding alone is not sufficient to estimate workload requirements.  The RVU 
provides insight into the workload intensity for basic health services within professional 
medical specialties such as family practice medicine and provides greater understanding 
of required support to the provider for an expected level of demand.  Such a model in 
theory is an incremental step towards promoting fiscal transparency and development of 
measures of effectiveness. 
Determining medical manpower requirements requires a rational approach to 
estimating the medical workload.  Industry benchmarking initiatives to capture 
appropriate workload for medical providers serve as the basis to calculating appropriate 
manpower levels.  The ongoing efforts to measure the average daily intensity of work 
produced by a single provider for all medical specialties has laid the ground work for 
developing a manpower estimation calculation.  It follows that any rational process that 




Table 4.   Categories of Care [Source: Naval Health Research Center,  Humanitarian 
Assistance  and Disaster Relief Operations T-AH, 2006 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. WHAT IS THE MODEL? 
The demand-driven model provides a logical framework using Microsoft Office’s 
Excel software.  It is comprised of a series of worksheets that link together DoD 
humanitarian medical assistance information from two levels; government policies and 
community healthcare requirements.  For the demand-driven perspective the model was 
designed to merge the standard statistical indicators information collected on a specific 
country with the medical specialty benchmarks for productivity.  Merging medical 
workload with medical specialty productivity benchmarks creates a ratio that aligns 
medical manpower requirements to the demand for basic healthcare services within a 
given country.  The model navigates end users to internationally recognized sources that 
publish specific information necessary to construct a country healthcare profile.  End 
users enter the specific statistical health indicators into identified worksheet information 
data fields.  These data fields merge the information into the workload calculation for 
determination of services and medical staffing requirements.  The demand-driven 
manpower model was adapted from the Fleet Requirements Manpower Determination 
Process.  This process evaluates inputs, throughput and results.  The results are 
subdivided into outputs and outcomes in order to disaggregate how the output relates to 




Figure 1.   Theoretical Demand Driven Manpower Model [Naval Postgraduate School, 
Manpower, Personnel and Training, 2008] 
 
B. MODEL FRAMEWORK 
The model was designed to translate three primary input elements into a 
manpower estimation output and create greater understanding of the operational 
environment through evaluating expected outcomes.  The three critical elements of the 
model include the mission objectives, standard statistical indicators, and medical 
manpower productivity.  It is important to note that the Fleet Manpower Determination 
process utilizes the Navy standard work week hours to develop staffing estimations in 
documents such as the Activity Manpower Document (AMD) and Fleet Manpower 
Document (FMD).  In the adapted model, the standard work hours for medical specialties 
utilizes Navy Medicine’s 168 hours per month work standard which is a shore based 
requirement (Naval Postgraduate School, 2008).  The throughput of the model translates 
the inputs in respect to country specific health requirements, associated workload, 
appropriate medical specialty, and manpower quantity required. 
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1. Model Input 
The first critical element for the model is the mission objective.  The mission 
objective is tied to the country health and intervention control initiatives.  These 
initiatives are fundamental to a country’s progress towards achieving millennium 
development goals.  The model requires the medical planner to input country status 
information by completing a MDG status sheet.  The status sheet is designed to give 
planners a means for subsequently evaluating strategic alignment of the manpower model 
estimations.  The purpose is to link country progress to global efforts within a given 
country.  Understanding the progress of countries towards these global efforts provides 
insight into vulnerable areas in need of capacity strengthening.  Country MDG status 
provides the first broad brush perspective for planners to ascertain what medical 
programs may or may not be required.  Also, the model framework addresses the issue of 
partnership through a series of questions based on USAID principles for developing 
countries.   The importance of aligning within the USAID framework for mission 
planners lies in developing partnership with USAID and corresponding NGOs operating 
within the country, as well as, discerning the appropriate level of humanitarian 
healthcare.  For example, countries that are considered stable may be more appropriate 
for advanced medical and education training.  Clearly, core basic healthcare services 
should be deployed to developing countries with limited health system capacity to align 
with international efforts. 
The model links planners to country specific documents that are generated by the 
country. The Country Cooperation Strategy and the DHS Country Report are examples of 
such documents.  These powerful documents contain country intervention control efforts 
and identify critical information for collaboration such as organizational structure of the 
health system, health investment as a percentage of country gross domestic product and 
key individuals involved in developing the country healthcare assessment.  This 
document also links government policies to local community health control interventions.  
Medical planners input health control intervention programs as mission objectives into 
the model which are used to assess manpower estimations for strategic alignment.  
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The second critical input to the model was derived from a comprehensive review 
of standard statistical indicators.  The model uses standard statistical indicators based on 
categories for morbidity and mortality coding identified in the Literature Review, the 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD).  A 
mapping exercise was conducted in order to review the potential 200 statistical 
indicators.  The indicators were mapped to determine how information flows from each 
source; for example, WHOSIS was identified as the central repository for health 
information and statistical reporting; however, UNICEF filters WHOSIS and DHS data to 
provide indicators for assessing child health programs.  Approximately 40 indicators fell 
outside the scope of this thesis into economic or social indicators, the remaining 160 were 
identified as health related and considered initially for inclusion into the demand model.   
The 160 indicators were then evaluated and selected for the model based on 
consistency of data collection and reporting as well as international recognition as 
appropriate statistical measures.  As stated above, the indicators were also reviewed in 
respect to alignment with MDG health specific efforts such as reducing child mortality, 
improving maternal health, combating aids, and tuberculosis.  The indicators were then 
evaluated for duplication; for example, indicators reported in wealth quintiles, and 
population distributions such as urban and rural were eliminated.  However, these 
indicators should be considered when the target mission sites are known as distribution of 
disease may be subject to population density or influenced by geography, climate or 
environmental factors.  Approximately 65 indicators were then reviewed in respect to 
demographics and while characteristics such as age and gender are important; they do not 
contribute to calculating demand for medical services based on injury and disease.  The 
remaining indicators were compared with the WHOSIS published list of 50 core 
healthcare indicators, which were again filtered to remove social and economic indicators 
not directly related to health, such as unemployment rates.   
The 50 indicators were matched to ensure capture under the model demographic 
indicator worksheet.  This worksheet serves as a general information source in mission 
planning efforts.  In sum, the user is required to input information on the 55 standard 
statistical indicators.  When the variable information is missing or not relevant, the user 
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leaves the field blank.  Blank fields will not hinder the model workload staffing 
calculation and will appear as a “#VALUE!” in the final output.  Entering zero is not 
advisable as unreported values do not indicate absence of disease rather it means that the 
prevalence or incidence is unknown. 
The third critical input element of the model includes determining medical 
manpower productivity.  Determining manpower productivity is based on historical 
clinical workload captured from the M-2 database.  The model also uses manpower 
productivity RVU medical specialty benchmarks for productivity measurement.  
However, as identified in the Literature Review, ICDs are not linked directly with the 
RVU.  The RVU is linked to the CPT.  To capture RVUs as input for the model, a 
comprehensive list of all ICD codes used by the MHS was requested from Naval Medical 
Center, San Diego (NMCSD).  NMCSD provided 13,590 MHS ICD-9 codes pulled 
directly from the M-2 database in January 2008.  These ICD-9 codes represent all ICD-9 
codes used to diagnose disease in the MHS.  
2. Model Throughput 
The model estimates the demand for basic health services using the standard 
statistical health indicator values to represent the health requirement per 1,000 patient 
encounters.  As identified by Sphere, it is appropriate to utilize staffing estimates on 
population demand for health services based on 1,000 lives.  The throughput translates 
input information in respect to country health need, types of medical treatment required 
to meet the need, to appropriate medical manpower to provide the treatment, to the 
number of providers scaled up to 1,000 patient encounters. 
In the model, the statistical indicators have been associated with ICD-9 diagnosis 
codes that are linked to basic health care CPT treatment codes.  These CPT codes are 
associated with the workload RVU measure which is used in the model to adjust country 
demand.  See Appendix C for the statistical health indicators utilized to estimate health 
care demand in the model.  Each ICD was matched to a corresponding statistical health 
indicator and clustered into nine categories: child health, dental, disease, family planning, 
fertility, maternal health, nutrition, optometry, and preventive health.  A second data 
request by disease cluster to NMCSD for M-2 data focused on capturing diagnosis by 
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disease group, disease, primary procedure (CPT), patient encounters, associated RVU 
weight per procedure, and total RVU weight per encounter.  The RVU weights were 
incorporated into the model to adjust the workload intensity of the country health demand 
obtained from the standard statistical indicators.  In order to develop total RVU weights 
by disease and illness, the 13,590 ICD-9s from the M-2 database were linked to ICD-9 
codes for the 55 standard statistical health indicators and potential 4,800 CPT codes.  The 
CPT codes were pulled from the M-2 database by querying ICD-9 codes.  The M-2 
database query also provided the associated RVU value for each CPT code.  The RVU 
values were aggregated as a total weight and used to ascertain the total workload for that 
disease category (RVU*base demand units). 
In order to evaluate which CPTs reflect standard physician practice, an 
assumption was made that the broadest and most common procedures were appropriate to 
capture basic health services in the model.  Physician productivity is based on Navy 
Medicine’s 168 standard work hours per month.  To allow flexibility to the end user in 
selecting the provider mix, the model is constructed using binary commands.  The model 
assumes some medical professionals may possess credentials that allow them to treat a 
range of patients.  For example, Family Practice physicians may be substituted for 
Pediatricians and OB/GYN providers.  This is important as the annual provider 
benchmarks established as Navy Medicine Productivity Benchmarks will vary according 
to clinical specialty.  The benchmark is published as an annual workload target.  There 
are approximately 75 clinical specialties from medicine to dentistry.  DoD HA guidance 
requires peacetime missions to remain within the scope of country healthcare capability.  
As such, specialty care was omitted from the model; however, all specialty benchmarks 
are available within the model. 
 Utilizing provider benchmarks requires conversion of annual provider RVU 
benchmarks to daily benchmarks.  To convert the RVU benchmark, the total benchmark 
is divided by 168 hours which is the standard outpatient hours per medical provider.  The 
168 hours was annualized in order to develop an hourly provider relative value unit 
benchmark based on 7.5 hours per day.  To calculate the total providers required by 
medical specialty.  The model is scaled based on patient population of 250, 500, 750, to 
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1,000.  With the end user selection of the provider type, the model calculates the total 
providers required per day based on the aggregated unmet medical demand of the country 
as identified by statistical health indicator.  The following calculation is the primary 
calculation used in the model to derive estimated manpower requirements.  See Appendix 
C for the complete list of calculations. 
 
Figure 2.   Medical Manpower Provider Calculation 
 
3. Model Results:  Outputs 
The model results in two outputs.  The first output is the estimated total providers 
per day by medical specialty.  The provider calculation reflects the number of medical 
specialty providers up to 1,000 patient encounters which is subject to end users selection 
of the type of medical provider.   The model scales the number of providers into 
population tier sizes that range from 250, 500, 750, to 1,000.  The second output is the 
estimated number of support staff assigned to assist the providers based on Navy 
Medicine Provider Productivity FY09 benchmarks.  These benchmarks recommend 
clinical support staff per provider full time equivalents.  The model allows for end user 
adjustment to assigned support staff ratios for greater flexibility in planning to the 
operational environment. 
For medical manpower mission planners, transparency of required resources to 
deliver care in the contextual environment is fundamental to operational planning.  It 
guards against cannibalization of manpower assets particularly when there are multiple 
mission sites per day.  Aligning manpower medical requirements to country health needs 
also reduces the effects of diminishing marginal returns resulting from ad hoc volunteer 
participation and improves operational efficiency. 
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4. Model Results:  Outcomes 
The model is designed to evaluate outcomes in respect to three elements.  These 
elements include alignment to country health needs, measureable objectives, and 
partnership.  To evaluate alignment to country need, a review of the model staffing 
estimations is recommended.  Medical planners should check to ensure alignment with 
the summary sheet of the model.  As identified in the Literature Review, humanitarian aid 
may have future unintended consequences that contribute to instability if the distribution 
of such aid is not carefully aligned to government control intervention programs.  
Specifically, the types of providers should be evaluated in respect to the results from the 
standard mission planning framework that aligns efforts between DoD HA guidance and 
USAID’s 9 principles of development.  DoD HA guidance and USAID’s 9 Principles 
(Ownership, Capacity-Building, Sustainability, Selectivity, Assessment, Results, 
Partnership, Flexibility, and Accountability) were used as a guide to develop a series of 
questions to measure alignment.  The following questions attempt to improve alignment 
between the DoD and USAID by creating a standard framework for mission planners: 
• Have you identified primary local health officials and what role do they 
play in the mission?  
• Do you know which medical technical skills and services align with 
country cooperative strategy?  
• Can the medical service or transfer of skill carry forward in the future?  
• Do medical services meet local medical requirements? 
• Does the medical service delivery meet best practices and design for local 
conditions?  
• Can you focus resources to clearly define measurable and strategically-
focused objectives?  
• Have you identified potential partners (government, community, donors, 
NGOs, private sector, international organizations, and universities)?  
• Are core medical services identified and scalable to maximize efficiency?  
• Is the standard data collection method incorporated into the mission?   
 
Summary results of these questions are pulled from their respective worksheet 
field and compiled within the model summary sheet—providing an at-glance perspective 
of how organizationally aligned the humanitarian medical mission is to USAID and DoD 
HA standards.  Such strategic alignment is inherently linked to a country level healthcare 
needs assessment, which drives the manpower medical planning model.   
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Measurable objectives can be developed from alignment to country control 
intervention programs at the basic healthcare level.  These programs provide an 
opportunity to develop sustainable programs with measurable objectives that may be 
monitored by third-party organizations or partners who remain in the area long after the 
DoD mission.  Core medical services may also be incorporated as standard operating 
procedure for each HA mission which reduces systematic variances in readiness and 
training.  The model is designed to increase awareness of how standardization can 
improve data collection efforts that lead to measuring mission effectiveness. 
In respect to partnerships, aligning manpower requirements to country healthcare 
demand is a step towards improving coordination with USAID and affiliated NGOs.   
When mission planners know the scope of medical services, they can evaluate manpower 
requirements against resources available and identify the gaps.  Manpower gaps serve as 
a clear starting point for dialogue with partners such as the target country, USAID, and 
NGOs, to provide specific skills to augment the mission.  Understanding the country 
health requirements in respect to available manpower assets required for mission 
execution promotes systematic improvements in mission effectiveness and staffing 
morale. 
  In conclusion, the model framework provides a rational approach to medical 
manpower planning to a country’s health requirement.  It serves as a stepping stone to 
align manpower resources and facilitate powerful opportunities for partnership.  Such 
alignment creates broader understanding on how to increase health program capacity 
often found in sustainable programs.  The model serves as an innovative solution to 
strengthen transformational efforts and reduce inefficiencies associated with the current 
AMD-driven manpower planning structure, while exposing synergistic and innovative 
programs that build capacity, promote sustainability, and cultivate partnerships. 
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IV. RESULTS  
To test the power of a demand driven manpower model a pilot test was conducted 
using data for the Republic of Kenya, a country located in eastern Africa.  Using the 
model’s standard statistical indicators, data was pulled in accordance with the model 
framework.  To evaluate the unmet health demands of Kenya’s approximate thirty four 
million people, data were collected for the requisite 55 health statistical indicators.  The 
data values, obtained from WHOSIS, Global Health Atlas, and UNICEF databases, were 
inputted into the model and standardized into the base demand units, see Appendix C for 
the complete model.  Appendix C also provides directions that guide medical mission 
planners through the following seven steps: 
1. Select country of interest and review country health objectives 
2. Completion of the Millennium Development Goal Status Worksheet 
3. Query WHOSIS database for country specific data 
4. Obtain UNICEF statistics on immunization coverage 
5. Query Global Health Atlas for country specific data 
6. Assign binary values for medical specialty responsibility 
7. Assess for strategic alignment 
The results obtained from the above seven steps on the Republic of Kenya are reported in 
accordance with the conceptual model framework.  The results include outputs and 
outcomes. 
1. Model Output: Estimated Medical Manpower Requirements 
 Figure 2 captures the summary report generated by the Cooperman_Houde 
Manpower Model.  The information it provides includes: 1) key indicators utilized to  
determine the manpower requirements (Column D, Rows 7-61) , 2) the corresponding 
projected need per 1000 encounters (Column G, Rows 7-61), 3) the sum of relative value 
units to provide basic care for the most general of the associated diagnosis (Column H, 
Rows 7-61) , 4) the resulting estimated workload intensity for those projected per 1000 
encounters (Column I, Rows 7-61), 5) the health care specialty designated to take the lead 
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in caring for those encounters (Columns J-R, Rows 7-61), 6) the resulting estimated 
manpower requirements for four population scenarios-- 1000, 750, 500, and 250 patients 
(Column D, Rows 7-61), and 7) a pie diagram showing the resulting  distribution of 
health care services.   
Take for example row 26.  The indicator is “Children (age<10) blind due to 
Trachoma.”  Given the data from Unicef’s database it was determined that for every 1000 
encounters there will be potentially 300 children with Trachoma, a chronic bacterial 
infection that can lead to blindness if untreated.  Making the assumption that an 
individual with Trachoma will receive an ophthalmology exam (worth 0.88 RVUs) and 
be educated on self-management (worth 0.02 RVUs if taught in a group of 5-8 patients) 
the conservative total workload to provide care for one Trachoma patient is 0.90 RVUs 
(cell H:26).  Aggregating the RVU workload and multiplying it by the total projected 
number of 300 encounters results in a total workload of 270 RVUs (cell I:26).  Thus, for 
every 1000 encounters in a 7.5 hour workday there is an estimated workload intensity of 
270 RVUs related to Trachoma.  That total workload intensity is then divided by the daily 
RVU benchmark of the health care service designated to care for that indicator.   
Selection of the benchmark is dependent upon the specialty selected by the user.  
The model requires the end user to assign the medical specialty to the indicator.  The 
model requires the end user to follow the binary approach of assigning a “1” in the cell to 
denote the desired specialty, otherwise the model defaults to zero values indicating the 
absence of that medical specialty provider.  The specialty is listed at the top of the 
column in the worksheet.  Once the specialty is assigned to the indicator, the model 
assumes that medical specialty will provide the corresponding health care for the target 
population.  In this example, the user of the model selected Ophthalmology (note the “1” 
in cell O:26) as the service assigned to care for Trachoma patients. Ophthalmology has a 
daily benchmark of 27.53 RVUs per provider.  The total workload of 270 RVUs divided 
by 27.53 RVUs equals 9.8.  Rounding this number up, the manpower requirement for 
Ophthalmologists is 10 (cell M:65).   
This method is repeated for each indicator and aggregated into an estimated 
manpower requirement.   This total is comprised of the number of physicians per 
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specialty and the associated number of clinical support staff.  For Kenya, to treat 
approximately 1,000 patients the model estimates a manpower requirement of 103 total 
physicians and 207 clinical support staff for a mission occurring over a seven and a half 
hour time period.  The “Summary Overview” contained in Appendix C provides the 
aggregated medical specialty service mix for Kenya.  This mix includes: 54% pediatrics, 
24% Family Practice, 10% Ob-Gyn, 9% Ophthalmology, and 3% Internal 
medicine/Infectious disease.  These proportions would change according to how the end 
user assigns medical specialties to the various statistical indicators.  In addition for 
Kenya, no assignments were made for oral maxillofacial surgery or general dentistry 
which could be a modular addition to the model. 
2. Model Output: Estimated Manpower Clinical Support 
The second output is the support staffing estimation.  The model assumes that for 
every one full time equivalent (FTE) Ophthalmologist, the model estimates 2.2 clinical 
support staff per provider.  Using the model we estimate a need for 9.8 providers per 
1,000 patient encounters and the corresponding clinical support staff is approximately 22 
FTEs (cell M:71).  The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery business guidelines define 
clinical support staff as those directly involved in patient care by assisting the provider in 
their clinical activities.  This includes nurses, hospital corpsman, and technicians.  The 
model provides for the use of non provider educators, however, there is no standard RVU 
benchmark.  The model includes an estimated RVU value of 10.00 which resulted in 37 
educators per 1,000 patients.  This RVU value should be evaluated by nurse educators 





Figure 3.   Medical Manpower Model Estimate:  Kenya Results [Cooperman_Houde 
Model, 2008) 
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3. Model Outcomes: Alignment to Country Health Requirements 
Assessment of Kenya’s progress towards achieving MDG goals is mixed.  Overall 
Kenya has made progress in improving access to primary education however, suffers the 
economic, political, and social challenges associated with poverty and high population 
densities in urban settings.  MDG program goals and status are as follows: 
• MDG 1 includes eradicating extreme poverty and hunger—Kenya has made 
insufficient progress.   
• MDG 2 and 3, universal primary education and promoting gender equality—
Kenya has demonstrated efforts that remain on consistent with UNICEF 
monitoring. 
• MDG 4, reduction in child mortality—Kenya has made no progress 
• MDG 5, significant improvements have been made in maternal health. 
• MDG 6 targets decreasing prevalence of HIV/Aids and combating other 
diseases such as malaria; however, population growth in urban areas and 
shortage of health workers in rural areas are major challenges.  A lack of 
health workers and the institutional capacity to deliver millions of dollars of 
aid investment across Africa are major barriers to health service coverage in 
rural areas 
• MDG 7 demonstrates that development programs are on-track towards 
improving access to drinking water but there is not progress in sanitation.  
Tuberculosis is identified as a problem exacerbated by population density and 
traditional community practices such as sharing of food. 
• MDG 8, while important, remains beyond the scope of this model.  The pilot 
test demonstrates percentage of alignment through the assignment of binary 
values of 1 and 0 as planners answer the nine alignment questions.   
 
To further assess the issue of alignment, the following information was obtained from 
Kenya’s mission objectives and strategies in response to the models specific alignment 
questions: 
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1.  Have you identified primary local health officials and what role do they 
play in the mission?   Yes, from Kenya’s Country Cooperation Strategy available 
for the period 2002 through 2005.  Regional Director, WHO, Regional Office for 
Africa.  The Director, Office of Development Planning, USAID.  Additional in-
country organizations include the Swedish International Development Agency, 
United Nations Program on Aids, United Nations Development Assistance 
Framework, United Nations Drug Control Program, United Nations Population 
Fund, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations 
Children’s Fund, University of Nairobi, the United States Agency for 
International Development, World Bank, World Food Program, and World Health 
Organizations.  
2.  Do you know which medical technical skills and services align with 
country cooperative strategy?  Yes, from Kenya’s Country Cooperation Strategy 
infant mortality and child mortality rates are increasing, see Figure 3.  In addition, 
the top ten diseases are identified as ear infection, rheumatism, eye infections, 
urinary tract infections, accidents, intestinal worms, diarrhea, skin disease, acute 
respiratory illness, malaria and other diseases. Malaria is identified as the leading 
cause of morbidity and mortality for distribution of these top ten diseases see 
Figure 4. 
3.  Can the medical service or transfer of skill carry forward in the future?  
Yes, identification of basic health education programs that increase capacity or 
align with country efforts by medical specialty can be developed.  Also, Kenya 
maintains a Ministry of Health with two national hospitals, eight provincial 
hospitals, and 70 district hospitals. 
4.  Do medical services meet local medical requirements? Yes, the model 
incorporates only Family Practice, Pediatric, Optometry, and Environmental 
Health specialties.   
5.  Does the medical service delivery meet best practices, and design for 
local conditions? Yes, all medical care is provided in accordance to standards of  
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humanitarian medical care for each medical specialty; however, without a proper 
site evaluation, some services may not be appropriate due to the lack of required 
equipment and facilities. 
6.  Can you focus resources to clearly define measurable and strategically-
focused objectives?  Yes, the Country Cooperative Strategy identifies the Directly 
Observed Treatment Short Course (DOTS) to combat tuberculosis and sanitation 
education at the community level as a national strategy.  The Ministry of Health 
has been decentralizing administration of the health programs shifting the 
administrative oversight to the community level.  This endeavor requires an 
increase in capacity to strengthen the community’s institutional framework for 
delivering health services that can be supported by Sub-Saharan Africa policy and 
other non-national objectives which includes education for reproductive and child 
health. Kenya identifies these as major contributors to maternal death, often 
exacerbated by traditional practices such as female genital mutilation.    
7.  Have you identified potential partners (government, community, 
donors, NGOs, private sector, international organizations, and universities)?   
Yes, USAID, Office of Sustainable Development is responsible for managing 
U.S. NGOs development programs operating within the region. 
8.  Are core medical services identified and scalable to maximize 
efficiency?  Yes, manpower requirements are based on basic core health services 
scaled by population from 250, 500, 750, and 1,000 patient encounters per day.   
9.  Is the standard data collection method incorporated into the mission?  
Yes, MHS ICD-9 codes with associated basic CPT codes are provided to captured 
workload for each patient encounter; however, medical specialties should review 
the codes to improve data quality.   
 In summary, the model’s manpower estimation strategically aligns to the 
country’s existing health intervention programs.  Particular attention should be paid to 
child and maternal health care.  Target programs that enhance capacity include 
immunizations, preventive medicine, and nutrition.  
 71
 
Figure 4.   Trends of Selected Health Indicators, 1962-1998, [World Health 
Organization, Country Cooperation Strategy, 2003] 
 
 
Figure 5.   Top 10 Causes of Morbidity in 1999 [World Health Organization, Country 
Cooperation Strategy, 2003] 
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4. Model Outcomes:  Measurable Objectives 
For Kenya, standard statistical indicators are used to evaluate country progress 
towards broad based goals.  There are no known Navy Medicine standards that may be 
applied to measure the success of objectives.  Development of standardized data 
collection for humanitarian medical missions is highly recommended. 
5. Model Outcomes:  Partnership 
From the manpower model, it is clear that Navy Medicine cannot meet all the 
staffing needs to treat a population up to 1,000 per day for a large-scale peacetime 
mission.  However, using the model, planners can identify the gaps in staffing.  Known 
staffing gaps serves as the basis for dialogue with volunteer organizations regarding the 
types of medical services required rather than missions driven by volunteer availability.  
Additional support may be found with USAID.  USAID considers Kenya a country in a 
developing state therefore, the provision of basic humanitarian healthcare is appropriate.  
Countries identified as developing have indigenous capability and an existing network of 
NGOs.  NGOs may be willing to share their limitations in carrying out their specific 
mission with the DoD.  NGO programs that are tied to long run sustainability, but are 
limited by the myriad of confounding factors such as geography or climate, may be 
appropriate for partnering with the DoD. 
Partnership fosters communication among all organizations and institutions and is 
necessary to harmonize health interventions and leverage capacity to weather emerging 
crisis.  This is particularly true for regions of the world where health-specific disease 
clusters are known.  For example, in 2007 the Horn of Africa experienced regional 
flooding.  David Okello, WHO Representative for Kenya, observed the potential de-
stabilizing effects of regional floods in this area, and in response authored a WHO 
concept paper that called upon WHO partners to collaborate on three strategic objectives:  
• Reduce immediate risk of excess mortality and morbidity due to outbreaks 
of communicable diseases and loss of access to health care in flood 
affected areas. 
• Prepare for all foreseeable contingencies during the coming six months; 
increased political tensions and social distress, population movements, 
new weather vagaries, epidemics, etc. 
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• Strengthen public health program such as polio control, so that they are 
able to operate in an increasingly difficult environment. (2007, p.1) 
 
The infrastructure of Kenya’s health system is a vital element for understanding the 
distribution of services and access to care.  Demographic information is not directly 
included in the manpower calculations but are critical to manpower planning and site 
selection.  Demographics may influence NGO location and activities and thereby 
influence the Navy’s ability to cultivate partnerships.  Partnership is important to unity of 
effort particularly when surging existing capacity to promote future health stability.  
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V. DISCUSSION 
Alignment of medical manpower humanitarian mission planning to country health 
care needs is the essential ingredient for transforming wartime medical assets for use in 
peacetime operations.  This is fundamental because combat related injuries and illnesses 
are often proportionately different than those encountered during peacetime.  Symbolic 
returns to American reputation will not alleviate the underlying structural issues often 
associated with poverty.  Therefore, we cannot afford to waste valuable resources on 
short term gains in what is a long term commitment to achieving stability and security 
throughout the world.  The cultivation of partnerships today will alleviate future 
hardships associated with conflict and disaster tomorrow.  Partnerships have the potential 
to expand the economic scope of national resources needed in a cooperative security 
environment.  The humanitarian manpower model provides a logical path to estimating 
manpower requirements by directly linking personnel to workload.  However, the model 
is designed on the premise of partnership with the target country in order to alleviate only 
the broadest diseases and illnesses associated with poverty.  Humanitarian medical 
initiatives beyond a country’s capability are less likely to lead to sustainable outcomes.  
In addition, global efforts are concentrated at this level; therefore, they present the 
greatest opportunities for partnership.  In conclusion, we believe the model is the starting 
point for at least five improvements: 
• First, aligning the mission to the country need improves use of human 
capital assets and systematically aligns Navy Medicine readiness programs 
such as education and training 
• Second, providing planners with a logical framework to make sense of the 
vast information enables construction of a country health profile to target 
health services 
• Third, understanding country needs focuses manpower programming 
efforts   
• Fourth, identifying staffing gaps critical to the mission   
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• Fifth, consistent dialogue with primary partners, such as USAID, on the 
types of medical services and staffing 
1. Recommendations 
There are three recommendations: 1) adopt a country-centric approach to HA 
medical manpower planning, whether the Cooperman_Houde Model or another, 2) 
improve efficiency and effectiveness by identifying and prioritizing core medical services 
that align to the desired mission objectives and 3) standardize data collection efforts for 
the identified services in order to subsequently measure HA medical program 
effectiveness. 
2. Limitations 
Reliable and comprehensive information pertaining to country or regional health 
demographics is not always available.  Recent efforts to capture data on births, deaths, 
disease, and government spending on healthcare in many World Health Organization 
membership countries have improved but are still not optimal.  Frequently, births and 
deaths remain unreported for reasons that may range from the lack of formal reporting 
infrastructure to cultural practices.  Where data are captured, it is often incomplete and, 
due to numerous confounding factors, may not be used for comparative purposes.  
Household surveys have been the traditional medium for capturing demographic, fertility, 
and mortality information and are used to develop indicators such as mortality rates, 
nutrition rates, contagious and non-chronic disease incidence rates.  Household survey 
timing for data collection is an important consideration.  In many cases, data collection 
endeavors are resource intensive and occur over extended periods of time.  Often, current 
data may represent a period of five years, which may not reflect the current country 
health profile.  However, improvements due to economic changes or social and political 
policies are generally accepted influencers that occur over longer time horizons.  
Likewise, it is also accepted that environmental disaster and conflict rapidly degrade the 
health situation of a country and potentially set back development effort initiatives.  
Many of the projects and country control intervention programs experience marginal 
changes in response to the environment over time.  As such, the most recent data 
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available should be used in the model to establish a baseline estimate for manpower 
requirements but subsequent dialog with host nation representatives and partners such as 
USAID agents are required to adjust manpower estimates.   
Pre- and post-comparisons may be misleading in evaluating DoD Humanitarian 
impact within a target country as other environmental factors that impact the countries 
overall well-being cannot be ignored.  It is difficult to separate health program impact on 
disease without considering government capacity, economic prosperity or other 
confounding factors such as population shifts and demographic characteristics.  
Therefore, this data cannot serve as a measure of outcomes for these missions.  While 
recent efforts in data collection and the adoption of the DHS Measure Survey by most 
countries allows for a more-detailed perspective on the target country, as mentioned there 
are constant environmental or confounding factors that may change these health statistics 
beyond the deployment and interventions with HA missions. 
The absence of standardized data collection for basic medical services limits the 
power of the manpower model.  The model provides a first step in developing measurable 
objectives but is contingent upon the identification and prioritization of basic health 
service programs.  The returns to standardized data collection include optimization of all 
support programs that directly impact the overall effectiveness and efficiency of 
delivering humanitarian medical care.  Moreover, measureable objectives provide a 
means to capture any variance and improve manpower readiness and training.  They may 
also easily transfer from one country, such as Kenya, to other developing countries.  This 
is important for those health programs that combat disease such as immunizations, 
malaria, and DOTs programs because management of these diseases have long-term 
effects on a population’s health.  Left untreated these diseases may exacerbate the 
potential for conflict and destabilization. 
3. Future Considerations 
The model uses RVU benchmarks that contain outpatient and inpatient medical 
visits.  A more accurate approach would be to carve out inpatient workload by measuring 
clinical specialty workload based on Manpower Estimate (MEPRS) data.  In addition, the 
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model relies on basic health statistical indicators predominately associated with the 
burden of contagious and preventable diseases because in most developing countries, 
medical care that exceeds country capability is not sustainable.  For example, treatment 
of non-contagious diseases such as high blood pressure may require pharmaceutical 
intervention which most aid recipients can not afford.  While such diseases should not be 
ignored, the issue of sustainable health care programs remains at large.  This is evident by 
the overwhelming number of people in the world who suffer from malnutrition.  Future 
medical mission planning should adopt research and development initiatives improve 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
Center for Stability and Reconstruction. (2007). Cleaning house: Confronting illicit 
power structures in the post conflict world. Retrieved January 16, 2008, from 
http://www.nps.edu/CSRS/Events/AntiCorruption%20II/index.html.  
Clunan, A. (2006). Civil military medicine: On dangerous ground. Monterey, CA: Center 
for Stabilization & Reconstruction Studies.  
Congressional Research Service. (2007). Military medical care: Questions & answers. 
Retrieved January 8, 2008, from http://www.docuticker.com/?p=18522 . 
Darrell, P. (2006). Use of operations and maintenance funds during deployment: An 
informative overview of the use of O&M Funds during an overseas deployment, 
exercise or other military operation. Entrepreneur.Com. Retrieved February 13, 
2008, from http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/156552573_2.html.  
Department of Defense. (2000). Policy to improve military treatment facility (MTF) 
primary care manager enrollment capacity. Washington, DC: The Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs.  
Department of Defense. (2004). National military strategy of the United States of 
America: A strategy for today; a vision for tomorrow. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs 
of Staff . 
Department of Defense. (2006). JP 3-0, Joint Operation. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. 
Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency.(2006). Overseas humanitarian, 
disaster, and civic aid (ODHDCA). Retrieved January 8, 2008, from  
http://www.pentagon.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/budget_justification/pdfs/01
_Operation_and_Maintenanace/OM_VOL_1_PARTS/OHDACA.pdf . 
Department of the Navy, Navy medicine provider productivity benchmarks FY08. 
Washington, D.C. : Bureau of Medicine & Surgery. 
Department of Medical Modeling Simulation and Mission Support, (2006).  
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations T-AH,  San Diego, 
California: Naval Health Research Center. 
Houle, Barbara J., Sagarin, Brad, J., Kaplan, Martin F. (2005). A Functional Approach to 
Volunteerism:  Do Volunteer Motives Predict Task Preference? Osher Institute, 
California State University-Channel Islands, Basic and Applied Social 
Psychology,  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 80
Levy, R. (1999). Activating the hospital ships: Supply issues. Alexandria, VA: Center for 
Naval Analysis.  
Levy, R., & Miller, R. (1998). Medical operational requirements in support of the 
OPLAN. Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analysis.  
Llewellyn, C., & Drifmeyer, J. (2002). U.S. participants perspectives on military medical 
humanitarian assistance. Bethesda, MD: Center for Disaster and Humanitarian 
Assistance Medicine.  
Malik, T., Marakat, M., Mohamed, M., & Almazary, F. (2005). World health 
organization: Health information service unit: gap analysis report for medical 
staffing resources in greater Darfur. Sudan: HISU-WHO Sudan. Retrieved 
November 15, 2007, from 
http://search.who.int/search?ie=utf8&site=default_collection&client=WHO&proxyst
ylesheet=WHO&output=xml_no_dtd&oe=utf8&q=gap+analysis . 
Margesson, R. (2007). International crisis and disasters: U.S. humanitarian assistance, 
budget trends, and issues for Congress. CRS Report Prepared for Congress. 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved December 16, 2007, 
from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33769.pdf . 
Mayo-Smith, M., & Frisbee, K. (2003). VHA physician productivity and staffing task 
force: report of the primary care subcommittee. Washington, DC: Department of 
Veterans Affairs, Retrieved December 8, 2007, from  
http://www1.va.gov/primary/docs/VHAPhysicianProductivityandStaffingTaskForce.
doc. 
McGrady, E. D., & Strauss, D. (2007).USNS mercy humanitarian deployment: What is 
the meaning of naval engagement? Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 
Retrieved November 9, 2007, from www.dtic.mil . 
McGuinness, K. (2006). USNS mercy and the changing landscape of humanitarian and 
disaster response. Military Medicine, 2006, vol. 171, no.10, pp. 48-52. Retrieved 
January 20, 2008, from 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3912/is_200610/ai_n16810502 . 
McNeil, M., Kuehnast, K., & O'Donnell, A. (2004). Assessing capacity for community-
based development: A pilot study in Tajikistan. Tajikistan: World Bank Institute. 




Measure DHS. (2008). Demographic and health surveys: Quality information to plan, 
monitor and improve population, health, and nutrition programs. Maryland: Measure 
DHS, Macro International Inc. Retrieved January 8, 2008, from 
http://www.measuredhs.com/aboutdhs/whoweare.cfm . 
Military Sealift Command. (2008). USNS mercy T-AH 19 homepage. Retrieved 
February 25, 2008, from http://www.mercy.navy.mil/htm/Mission.htm . 
Murray, C., & Lopez, A. (1996). Global health statistics: A compendium of incidence, 
prevalence, and mortality estimates for over 200 conditions, 2. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University on behalf of the World Health Organization and the World Bank.  
Naval War College. (2006). Joint doctrine for campaign planning. Newport: RI: Naval 
War College. 
Navy Medicine Personnel Training & Education Command. (2008). NAVMED MPT&E. 
Navy Medicine. Retrieved February 15, 2008, from 
http://navmedmpte.med.navy.mil/ . 
Naval Postgraduate School. (2008). Retrieved February 26, 2008, from 
http://web.nps.navy.mil/~kishore/mpt/requirement.process.determination.htm. 
Noonan, M. (2008). "Mind the Gap: Post-Iraq Civil-Military Relations in America." 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-notes.: Retrieved January 15, 2008, from 
www.fpri.org  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense-Global Security Affairs. (2007). Policy 
Guidance for FY08 Overseas Humanitarian Assistance. Washington D.C.: Retrieved 
November 8, 2007, from internal communication: CJTF-HOA, J-5  
Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2005). The National Defense Strategy of the United 
States of America. Washington, DC: Department of Defense.  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. (2006). Policy to improve 
Military Treatment Facility (MTF) primary care manager enrollment capacity. 
Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&Ra), Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy (M&Ra)), and Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (M,Ra,I&E). Retrieved 
February 15, 2008, from http://www.tricare.mil/policy/ha00pol/clin00_001.html . 
Okello, D. (2007). Horn of Africa 2007: A call for health action. Publication location: 
World Health Organization. Retrieved December 8, 2007, from 
http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/hoafrica/en/.  
 82
Rattleman, C., Levy, R., Carey, N., & Tsui, F. (2001). Wartime medical requirements: 
Profiles and requirement determination process. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval 
Analysis.  
Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Fund Development Board. (2005). Successful 
implementation of public private partnership model for water supply and sanitation 
in Nepal Himalaya Gautam. Kathmandu, Nepal: Rural Water Supply and Sanitation 
Fund Development Board. Retrieved January 15, 2008, from http://www.wepa-
db.net/pdf/0612sympo/paper/HimalayaGautam.pdf . 
Scholtes, P., Joiner, B., &. Streibel, B. (Eds.). (2003). 7 Step method overview, team 
handbook. 3rd ed. Waunakee, WI: Suttle-Straus.  
Spinelli, J. (2008) Peacetime operations: Reducing friction. Publication location: National 
Defense University. Retrieved January 16, 2008, from http://www.ndu.edu/ . 
Strauss, D. (2007). Input to COMPACFLT assessment of USNS Mercy's humanitariann 
operation: Drivers for HA from the sea. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis. 
Retrieved November 9, 2007, from www.dtic.mil . 
Strauss, D., Felix, T., & Morrow, R. (2007). Input to COMPACFLT assessment of USNS 
Mercy's 2006 humanitarian operation: Integration of NGOs, allied militaries, and 
ashore organizations. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis. Retrieved 
November 9, 2007, from www.dtic.mil . 
The Sphere Project. (2000). Sphere guidelines: Humanitarian charter and minimum 
standards in Disaster Response,. Chapter 5. Retrieved February 1, 2008, from 
http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com_docman/task,cat_view/gid,17/I
temid,203/lang,English/T.  
The United Nations General Assembly. (2000).  55/2 United Nations Millennium 
Declaration United Nations, Retrieved January 15, 2008, from 
http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf .  
The World Bank Institute. (2008). Kenya and the World Bank Fact Sheet. Retrieved 
March 4, 2008 from, http://www.worldbank.org/.  
U.S. Agency for International Development. (2008). U.S. Agency for International 





U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine. "Federal Service 
Optometry Coding Guide v.20." Department of Occupational and Environmental 
Medicine. Retrieved December 16, 2007, from http://chppm-
www.apgea.army.mil/doem/coding/RVUS.aspx . 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2008). Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid services. Retrieved February 15, 2008, from 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/History/. 
United Nations. (2008). UN millennium development goals. Retrieved January 15, 2008, 
from http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/goals.html.  
United Nations Development Programme. (2007) Tracking the MDGs: 2007 progress 
report. Retrieved November 30, 2007, from http://www.undp.org/mdg/.  
United States Congress (2006) Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review, 
[H.A.S.C. No. 109-103], Committee on Armed Services,  Washington, D.C., March 
14, 2006 
World Health Organization. (2007). Preventing chronic diseases: A Vital Investment. 
Canada.: World Health Organization and the Public Health Agency of Canada, 2007, 
Retrieved November 2, 2007, from 
http://www.who.int/chp/chronic_disease_report/contents/en/index.html. 
World Health Organization. (2008). Programmes and projects: World Health 
Organization statistical indicator system (WHOSIS). World Health Organization. 
Retrieved January 25, 2008, from http://www.who.int/whosis/en/. 
World Health Organization. (2008). History of the development of the ICD, World 
Health Organization .Retrieved January  2008, from 
 http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/HistoryOfICD.pdf . 
Wurthwein, R., Gbangou, A., Sauerborn, R., & Schmidt, C. (2001). Measuring the local 
burden of disease. A study of years of life lost in sub-Saharan Africa. International 
Journal of Epidemiology 30, 3-77. 
 84
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 85




SUBJECT:  POLICY GUIDANCE FOR FY08 OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE  
  
COMMANDS PASS TO COMMAND SURGEONS, PLANS AND OPERATIONS OFFICE (3/5). 




A.  SECTIONS 402, 2557, AND 2561, TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE B.  JULY 
2007 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION GUIDANCE C.  FEDERAL 
ACQUISITION REGULATION, PART 2.101, DEFINITION OF MICRO-PURCHASE THRESHOLD  
  
1.  SUMMARY.  THIS MESSAGE FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY) PROVIDES AND 
REFINES THE POLICY GUIDANCE FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. END SUMMARY.  
  
2.  THE FOLLOWING GOVERNS THE EXECUTION OF DOD'S HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
(HA) PROGRAM.  THESE GUIDELINES ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE ALL-INCLUSIVE; THEY 
CANNOT ANTICIPATE EVERY TYPE OF PROJECT THAT WILL BE SUBMITTED BY THE 
COMBATANT COMMANDS (COCOM) OR EVERY SITUATION FOR WHICH DOD 
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE.  HOWEVER, THEY PROVIDE A 
TOOL WITH WHICH THE COMMANDS CAN EVALUATE THE APPROPRIATENESS OF 
POTENTIAL PROJECTS.  THE DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY (DSCA) WILL 
ISSUE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE UNDER SEPARATE COVER.  THE COCOMS ARE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ISSUING SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBORDINATE 
ELEMENTS AND ARE ENCOURAGED TO DRAFT A HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUAL.    
  
3.  HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE GENERAL GUIDANCE:  
  
A.  DOD HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (HA) IS A SIGNFICANT TOOL FOR ACHIEVING U.S. 
SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND REFLECTS AMERICAN VALUES.  THE SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE HAS PROMULGATED SECURITY COOPERATION GUIDANCE THAT APPLIES 
DIRECTLY TO DOD HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES.  EMPLOYING ALL THE 
SECURITY COOPERATION TOOLS AT DOD?S DISPOSAL TO PROSECUTE THE GLOBAL WAR 
ON TERRORISM (GWOT) REMAINS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY FOR DOD SENIOR LEADERSHIP.  
ALL COMBATANT COMMANDS ARE URGED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO PROJECTS THAT 
ADDRESS GWOT OBJECTIVES AND MUST ENSURE THAT THE SELECTION, PRIORITIZATION, 
AND SUSTAINMENT PLANS FOR THEIR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES ARE 
CONSISTENT WITH THIS GUIDANCE AND INTEGRATED INTO THEIR THEATER SECURITY 
COOPERATION PLANS.  
  
B.  IMPORTANT COMPLEMENTARY SECURITY GOALS THAT HA SHOULD AIM TO ACHIEVE 
INCLUDE THOSE OF DIRECT BENEFIT TO DOD, SUCH AS IMPROVING DOD VISIBILITY, 
ACCESS, AND INFLUENCE IN A PARTNER NATION OR REGION; GENERATING LONG-TERM 
POSITIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS AND GOODWILL FOR DOD; AND PROMOTING 
INTEROPERABILITY AND COALITION-BUILDING WITH FOREIGN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN 
COUNTERPARTS..  JUST AS IMPORTANT ARE INDIRECT BENEFITS TO USG SECURITY 
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INTERESTS THAT ARISE FROM IMPROVING BASIC LIVING CONDITIONS OF THE CIVILIAN 
POPULACE IN A COUNTRY/REGION SUSCEPTIBLE TO TERRORIST/INSURGENT INFLUENCE; 
ENHANCING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE HOST NATION BY IMPROVING ITS CAPACITY TO 
PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SERVICES TO ITS POPULACE, INCLUDING RESPONDING TO 
DISASTERS AND OTHER CRISES; AND BUILDING/REINFORCING SECURITY AND 
SUSTAINABLE STABILITY IN A 
HOST NATION OR REGION.    
  
C.    HA MUST COMPLEMENT, BUT NOT DUPLICATE OR REPLACE, THE WORK OF 
OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES (E.G., USAID, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES) OR OTHER  HOST NATION AUTHORITIES, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS, OR LOCAL OR INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS. 
PROJECTS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH, AND COMPLEMENTARY TO, THE USG 
DEVELOPMENT PLAN AS OUTLINED BY USAID AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, ESPECIALLY WITH USAID, IS IMPORTANT AND MUST 
BE CONDUCTED PRIOR TO PROJECT APPROVAL.    
  
D. TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE PRIORITIZATION OF PROJECTS WITHIN EACH COCOM AOR, 
HA PROGRAM MANAGERS MUST PROVIDE A RANKED LISTING OF ALL PROJECTS AT THE 
TIME OF ANNUAL SUBMISSION TO DSCA FOR REVIEW.  THIS LIST SHOULD REFLECT EACH 
PROJECT?S RELATIVE IMPORTANCE IN THE COCOM?S SECURITY COOPERATION PLANS.  
PROJECT PRIORITIZATION SHOULD DERIVE FROM SECURITY COOPERATION GUIDANCE, 
THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION GUIDANCE, AND COMPLEMENTARY PRIORITIES 
ESTABLISHED BY THE COMBATANT COMMANDER. 
OUT-OF-CYCLE SUBMISSIONS SHOULD ALSO BE ASSIGNED A RANKING AND 
INCORPORATED INTO THE OVERALL LIST.    
  
E.  ACCOUNTABILITY:  SOME PROJECTS ARE CARRIED OUT IN COUNTRIES WHERE IT IS 
PRUDENT TO SET UP PARTICULARLY STRINGENT ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE THE 
PROPER END-USE OF PROVIDED EXCESS PROPERTY/GOODS/EQUIPMENT.  IN SUCH CASES, 
COMMAND PROGRAM MANAGERS AND COUNTRY TEAMS MUST DETERMINE THE MOST 
EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE WAY TO VERIFY APPROPRIATE END-USE OF HA MATERIALS 
AND INCLUDE THIS IN THE PROPOSAL.   
  
F.  SUSTAINABILITY:  ALL HA PROJECTS MUST BE SUSTAINABLE BY THE HOST NATION 
AFTER DIRECT US MILITARY SUPPORT HAS ENDED.  FOR CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECTS, 
EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON KNOWLEDGE/SKILLS TRANSFER, NOT SIMPLY DONATION OF 
SUPPLIES OR EQUIPMENT, BUT SHOULD PRIMARILY FOCUS ON THE BASIC 
HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.  ALL PROJECT SUBMISSIONS WILL 
INCLUDE A PLAN OF ACTION FOR HOST NATION PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY, AS WELL AS 
CONFIRMATION OF HOST NATION WILLINGNESS AND CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN IT.  AS 
NOTED IN PARA 3.C., OTHER USG AGENCIES MAY ASSIST WITH SUSTAINABILITY OF 
PROJECTS.  TO MAXIMIZE SUSTAINABILITY, PROJECTS SHOULD USE ACCEPTED LOCAL OR 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (SUCH AS SPHERE ? WWW.SPHEREPROJECT.ORG) RATHER 
THAN U.S. STANDARDS, WHEN APPROPRIATE.  
  
G.  AFTER-ACTION REPORTING:  THE OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE SHARED 
INFORMATION SYSTEM (OHASIS) WILL GENERATE A BLANK AFTER-ACTION REPORT 
(AAR) AT THE TIME OF PROJECT SUBMISSION.  THE IN-COUNTRY PROJECT POC MUST 
COMPLETE THE AAR IN OHASIS WITHIN 30 DAYS OF PROJECT TURNOVER TO THE 
RECIPIENT.  NO PROJECT CAN BE MARKED AS COMPLETE IN OHASIS UNTIL THE AAR IS 
POSTED.  FOR ALL PROJECTS THAT EXCEED $10,000, THE RESPONSIBLE SAO OR COCOM 
WILL POST A FOLLOW-UP AAR IN OHASIS  ONE YEAR FOLLOWING PROJECT COMPLETION 
TO DOCUMENT SUSTAINMENT AND METRICS.  THE AFTER-ACTION REPORT SHOULD 
CONFIRM THAT THE PROJECT IS STILL OPERATING AS INTENDED, OUTLINE ANY 
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MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS THAT CAPTURE THE PROJECT?S IMPACT LOCALLY, AND 
VERIFY THAT THE HOST NATION OR OTHER PARTNERS ARE SUSTAINING IT.  FAILURE TO 
PERFORM IMMEDIATE AND ONE-YEAR AFTER ACTION REPORTS WILL GENERALLY 
RESULT IN SUSPENSION OF OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN DISASTER AND CIVIC AID 
(OHDACA) FUNDS FOR FUTURE PROJECTS IN THAT COUNTRY.  IF EXTENUATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES PREVENT AFTER ACTION REPORTS FROM BEING COMPLETED, THEN 
EXCEPTIONS WILL BE CONSIDERED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.   
  
H.  METRICS:  AT A MINIMUM, PROJECT NOMINATIONS SHOULD CONTAIN A BASIC PLAN 
FOR MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS THAT INCLUDES HA PERFORMANCE (PROCESS) 
INDICATORS (E.G. ,SCHOOL/CLINIC CONSTRUCTED; EP SUPPLIES DELIVERED; FIRST 
RESPONDER TRAINING COMPLETED) AND HA OUTCOME (IMPACT) INDICATORS (E.G., 
NUMBER OF STUDENTS ATTENDING A SCHOOL; PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS TRAINED WHO 
USE THAT TRAINING; EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER/STANDARD OPERATING 
PROCEDURES  USE DURING DISASTER RESPONSE).  FURTHER, THE MEASURES OF 
EFFECTIVENESS RELATING TO TSC/COUNTRY CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE 
STATED IN THE PROJECT NOMINATION.  AN IMPORTANT AIM OF HA PROJECTS, ASIDE 
FROM PROVIDING ASSISTANCE WHERE AND WHEN IT IS NEEDED, IS TO BUILD MILITARY 
RELATIONSHIPS/COOPERATION AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO US SECURITY OBJECTIVES.  
WHERE APPROPRIATE, COCOM HA MANAGERS AND COUNTRY TEAM REPRESENTATIVES 
SHOULD SEEK ASSISTANCE WITH METRICS FROM THE HOST NATION, OTHER USG 
AGENCIES, NGOS, IOS, OR ACADEMIC 
INSTITUTIONS IN THE HOST NATION OR THE UNITED STATES.    
  
I.  EQUAL ACCESS:  HA PROJECTS ARE INTENDED TO BENEFIT THE CIVILIAN 
POPULATION OF THE HOST COUNTRY.    HA MUST BE DISTRIBUTED BASED ON AN 
OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS, NOT ON ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS.  
FOR PROJECTS THAT, AFTER COMPLETION, WILL BE OPERATED OR SUSTAINED BY A 
RELIGIOUS GROUP, PROJECT NOMINATIONS MUST INCLUDE CONFIRMATION THAT ALL 
SEGMENTS OF THE LOCAL POPULATION WILL HAVE EQUAL ACCESS TO THESE 
FACILITIES.   
  
J.  FOREIGN MILITARIES:  HA PROJECTS SHOULD NOT DIRECTLY BENEFIT FOREIGN 
MILITARIES OR PARAMILITARY GROUPS, SUCH AS THROUGH PROVISION OF COMBAT OR 
COMBAT-RELATED TRAINING AND MATERIEL.  (FOR THESE PURPOSES, OTHER 
ACQUISITION MEANS, SUCH AS FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS), AND OTHER TRAINING 
AVENUES, SUCH AS INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
(IMET) SHOULD BE PURSUED.) HOWEVER, IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS 
DISASTER PREPAREDNESS PROJECTS, FOREIGN MILITARIES MAY BE INVOLVED SO LONG 
AS THE ULTIMATE BENEFICIARY IS THE CIVILIAN POPULACE AND THE MILITARY UNIT 
HAS A HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OR DISASTER RESPONSE MISSION.  FOR EXAMPLE, IF 
A FOREIGN MILITARY UNIT?S MISSION, AS DESIGNATED BY THE HOST NATION, IS TO BE A 
PRIMARY  RESPONDER IN THE EVENT OF A DISASTER, THEN TRAINING OR EQUIPPING 
MEMBERS OF THAT MILITARY UNIT TO RESPOND MORE EFFECTIVELY MAY BE JUSTIFIED.  
ALL SUCH PROPOSALS MUST CLEARLY SPELL OUT THE RATIONALE FOR SUCH PROJECTS 
AND THE SCOPE OF TRAINING, AND MUST ALSO LINK THE BENEFIT TO THE CIVILIAN 
POPULACE. 
SAFEGUARDS/ VERIFICATION PROCEDURES MUST BE IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT 
EQUIPMENT FURNISHED IS USED ONLY FOR THE SPECIFIC HA PURPOSE INTENDED.  
APPROPRIATE HUMAN RIGHTS VERIFICATION MUST OCCUR BEFORE CONDUCTING HA 
TRAINING ACTIVITIES WITH HOST NATION MILITARY ELEMENTS.   
  
IF A FOREIGN MILITARY UNIT WITH A HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OR DISASTER 
RESPONSE MISSION IS TO BE TRAINED, OTHER TRAINING AVENUES, SUCH AS 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET), SHOULD BE PURSUED 
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FIRST. EXCESS PROPERTY PROVIDED TO FOREIGN MILITARIES MUST BE ROUTED 
THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, MUST BE INTENDED TO AID CIVILIANS IN THE 
EVENT OF A DISASTER, AND MUST NOT HAVE DUAL-USE APPLICATIONS (SUCH AS 
CERTAIN VEHICLES, BOATS, OR RADIOS).  ANY SUCH ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO FOREIGN 
MILITARIES MUST HAVE APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS/VERIFICATION PROCEDURES IN 
PLACE TO ENSURE IT IS USED ONLY FOR THE SPECIFIC HA PURPOSE INTENDED.  
  
K.  PARTNERING:  TWO CRITICAL COMPONENTS OF SECURITY COOPERATION ARE 
INTEROPERABILITY AND CAPACITY-BUILDING.  TO FOSTER THESE GOALS, HA PROJECTS 
MUST PARTNER WITH THE HOST NATION, AND SHOULD SEEK TO PARTNER WITH 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, OTHER DONOR NATIONS, LOCAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE PRIVATE SECTOR, OR 
THIRD PARTY ALLIED/COALITION MILITARIES, AND USG AGENCIES (E.G., STATE, USAID, 
AGRICULTURE, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES) AS APPROPRIATE, TO CONDUCT HA 
PROJECTS THAT BENEFIT THE CIVILIAN POPULACE AND ENHANCE THE HOST 
GOVERNMENT?S ABILITY TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SERVICES FOR ITS POPULACE.  
PARTNERING WITH THE HOST NATION MILITARY IS DISTINCT FROM DIRECTLY 
BENEFITING THE MILITARY.  IN PARTNERING ON AN HA PROJECT, THE FOREIGN 
MILITARY WOULD WORK WITH DOD TO BENEFIT THE CIVILIAN POPULACE DIRECTLY, 
THUS PROMOTING INTEROPERABILITY, CAPACITY-BUILDING, AND ENHANCING THE 
IMAGE OF HOST NATION GOVERNMENT IN THE EYES OF THE LOCAL POPULACE.  
  
L.  STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION:  TWO VITALLY IMPORTANT, BUT DIFFERENT, 
AUDIENCES EXIST FOR HA PROJECTS.  FIRST, HA PROJECTS SHOULD SEND A CONSISTENT 
AND SUSTAINED MESSAGE TO THE HOST NATION CIVILIAN POPULACE THAT THEIR 
GOVERNMENT IS CAPABLE OF, AND WILLING TO, PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SERVICES TO 
THEM, AND/OR IS CAPABLE OF RESPONDING TO CRISES.  SECOND, HA PROJECTS SHOULD 
SEND A TANGIBLE SIGNAL WITHIN THE HOST NATION, REGIONALLY AND EVEN 
GLOBALLY, THAT DOD AND THE USG  RESPOND TO HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND HAVE 
AN INTEREST IN THE WELL-BEING OF THOSE WHO ARE IN NEED.  COMMAND HA 
PROGRAM MANAGERS SHOULD COMMUNICATE TO ALL HA PROJECT PLANNERS AND 
IMPLEMENTERS THE NEED FOR APPROPRIATE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS.  WHERE 
APPROPRIATE, PROJECTS SHOULD INCLUDE SOME TANGIBLE, VISIBLE, AND 
SUBSTANTIVE MARKER OF BOTH DOD AND HOST NATION INVOLVEMENT, PREFERABLY 
WITH THE HOST NATION IN THE LEAD (CORNERSTONE, PLAQUE, SIGN, ETC.).  TO THE 
EXTENT POSSIBLE, DOD HA EFFORTS SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH ? AND SUPPORT ? 
BROADER U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS. 
PROJECTS SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO GENERATE A SUSTAINED POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE 
CIVILIAN POPULATION AND SUSTAINED GOODWILL, NOT A SINGLE PHOTO OPPORTUNITY, 
WHERE STRATEGIC MESSAGES AND PROJECT INTENTIONS COULD BE 
UNDERMINED BY LACK OF FOLLOW-UP.    
  
4.  HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROJECT-SPECIFIC GUIDANCE:  
  
A.  IN ADDITION TO ADVANCING U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS, DOD HA PROJECTS MUST 
ALSO ADDRESS LEGITIMATE HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF THE TARGETED POPULATION.  
PROJECTS MUST BE DESIGNED IN COORDINATION WITH HOST NATION REPRESENTATIVES 
AND USAID TO GENERATE A SUSTAINED HUMANITARIAN IMPACT. 
HEALTH PROJECTS MUST EMPHASIZE PUBLIC HEALTH CAPACITY-BUILDING (INCLUDING 
IMPROVING HOST NATION DISEASE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS).  HEALTH PROJECTS MUST 
BE COORDINATED WITH THE COMMAND SURGEON?S OFFICE, FROM INITIAL PROJECT 
DESIGN THROUGH EXECUTION AND FOLLOW-UP.  
UNITS UNDERTAKING MEDICAL ACTIVITIES GENERALLY MUST ENSURE THEY DO NOT 
SIGNIFICANTLY EXCEED THE STANDARDS OF CARE ALREADY PROVIDED BY THE HOST 
NATION.  PROVIDING CARE THAT SIGNIFICANTLY  EXCEEDS LOCAL STANDARDS CAN 
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HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE LOCAL HEALTH CARE INFRASTRUCTURE ONCE THE 
U.S. HA PROVIDERS HAVE DEPARTED.  THESE EFFECTS CAN RANGE FROM POPULAR 
EXPECTATIONS OF SIMILAR CARE FROM LOCAL HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, EXPECTED 
RETURN VISITS BY U.S. PROVIDERS, AND LACK OF SUSTAINABILITY FOR CARE PROVIDED.  
DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND A POTENTIAL DECLINE IN 
THE PERCEPTION OF THE USG MAY OCCUR SHOULD ANY OF THESE EFFECTS 
MATERIALIZE.   
   
B.  CAPACITY-BUILDING ACTIVITIES INVOLVE THE TRANSFER OF TECHNICAL 
KNOWLEDGE OR SKILLS TO INDIVIDUALS OR INSTITUTIONS SO THAT THEY ACQUIRE THE 
LONG-TERM, INDEPENDENT ABILITY TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE POLICIES AND DELIVER 
COMPETENT AND EFFECTIVE ESSENTIAL SERVICES (SUCH AS SAFE DRINKING WATER, 
SANITATION SYSTEMS, PUBLIC HEALTH, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, 
AND CRISIS/DISASTER RESPONSE).  EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON 
KNOWLEDGE/SKILLS TRANSFER, NOT SIMPLY DONATION OF SUPPLIES OR 
EQUIPMENT.      
  
NEW EQUIPMENT PURCHASES ARE PERMITTED ONLY ON AN EXCEPTIONAL BASIS 
BECAUSE THEY ARE GENERALLY INCONSISTENT WITH EFFORTS TO MAXIMIZE THE 
RETURN ON DOD?S RESOURCES.  ADDITIONALLY, NEW EQUIPMENT PURCHASES MUST 
NOT EXCEED THE HOST NATION?S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN AND REPAIR THE EQUIPMENT, 
OR EXCEED THE LOCAL STANDARDS.  EXAMPLES OF APPROPRIATE PROJECTS INCLUDE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOST NATION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES TO RESPOND TO 
MANMADE AND NATURAL DISASTERS, THE PRE-POSITIONING OF DISASTER RELIEF 
SUPPLIES, OR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS THAT PROVIDE AN 
EARLY WARNING OF DISEASE OUTBREAKS. 
ON AN EXCEPTIONAL BASIS, PROJECTS THAT GO BEYOND BASIC HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 
WILL BE APPROVED IF THEY CONTRIBUTE IN A DEMONSTRABLE MANNER TO SECURITY 
AND STABILITY IN A HOST NATION.  EXAMPLES OF ACTIVITIES THAT MIGHT FALL INTO 
THIS CATEGORY INCLUDE LIMITED IMPROVEMENTS TO A LOCAL ROAD OR BRIDGE TO 
ENABLE ESSENTIAL COMMERCE IN AN AT-RISK REGION OR MAKING REPAIRS TO BASIC 
INFRASTRUCTURE IN A DESTITUTE AREA.   
  
C.  PARTICIPATION OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES:  ALL HA PROJECTS ? INCLUDING EXCESS 
PROPERTY PROJECTS ? SHOULD MAXIMIZE VISIBLE U.S. MILITARY PARTICIPATION TO 
ENSURE THAT THE PROJECTS ARE EFFECTIVE SECURITY COOPERATION TOOLS.  ACTIVE 
DOD PARTICIPATION IMPROVES THE PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPING CHANNELS OF 
INFLUENCE AND ACCESS, POTENTIALLY PROVIDES OPERATIONAL READINESS BENEFITS, 
AND GENERATES UNIQUE TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES.  DOD'S ROLE MUST NOT BE 
REDUCED TO ONLY PROVIDING FUNDING.   
  
D.  CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS:  CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS SHOULD BE BASIC IN NATURE 
AND SHOULD GENERALLY NOT EXCEED $500,000 PER PROJECT.  PROPOSALS FOR 
PROJECTS EXCEEDING $500,000, PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION, WILL BE 
CONSIDERED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.  ?PROJECT SPLITTING,? 
DIVIDING A COSTLY CONSTRUCTION PROJECT INTO VARIOUS SEGMENTS TO KEEP IT 
UNDER THE $500,000 LIMIT, IS NOT AUTHORIZED.  FOR CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS, U.S. 
MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL?AT A MINIMUM?CONDUCT THE INITIAL SITE SURVEY, 
PROVIDE PERIODIC MONITORING OF THE PROJECT (IN CASES IN WHICH MORE DIRECT 
PROJECT SUPERVISION IS NOT FEASIBLE), AND CONDUCT AN AFTER 
ACTION EVALUATION OF THE COMPLETED PROJECT.    
E.  MINIMAL COST HA PROJECTS MAY BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT FORMAL NOMINATION 
OR APPROVAL BY DSCA.  COSTS FOR ANY HA PROJECT OR ACTIVITY ARE CONSIDERED 
MINIMAL IF THEY ARE $10,000 OR LESS.  THOSE PROJECTS MAY BE APPROVED BY THE 
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COCOM, BUT MUST STILL BE ENTERED INTO OHASIS FOR TRACKING AND REPORTING 
PURPOSES WITH KEYWORD MINIMAL COST  
  
F.  EXCESS PROPERTY (EP):  NON-LETHAL EP MAY BE PROVIDED BOTH AS PLANNED HA 
PROJECTS AND IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR DISASTER/EMERGENCY RELIEF. 
EP MUST NOT HAVE ANY DUAL USE APPLICATION.  COCOM HA MANAGERS HAVE ACCESS 
TO THE WORLDWIDE HA EP INVENTORY IN OHASIS.  COCOM HA MANAGERS SHOULD 
CONSULT THE INVENTORY AND WORK WITH WAREHOUSE MANAGERS TO DETERMINE 
HOW BEST TO MEET REQUIREMENTS.  CARE MUST BE TAKEN THAT THE RECIPIENT CAN 
OPERATE AND MAINTAIN DONATED PROPERTY.  AS REQUIRED BY LAW, ALL EP 
DONATIONS ARE TRANSFERRED FROM DOD TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN COUNTRY, 
AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION.  
  
G.  CONTRACTING:  FOR HA PROJECTS REQUIRING CONTRACTING EFFORT, EACH 
COMMAND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR OBTAINING CONTRACTING SUPPORT EITHER 
INTERNALLY OR THROUGH ANOTHER USG ORGANIZATION.  ONLY CONTRACTING 
OFFICERS ARE QUALIFIED TO OBLIGATE THE USG VIA CONTRACT.  UNLESS HA 
PERSONNEL POSSESS A CONTRACTING OFFICER?S WARRANT, THEY ARE NOT 
AUTHORIZED TO SIGN HA-RELATED CONTRACTS.  CONTRACTING OFFICERS MAY USE 
PROCEDURES OTHER THAN COMPETITIVE PROCEDURES ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY LAW 
AND THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR).  A MICRO-PURCHASE IS AN 
ACQUISITION OF SUPPLIES OR SERVICES USING SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITION PROCEDURES 
FOR AN AGGREGATE AMOUNT THAT DOES NOT EXCEED $3,000 OR, FOR ACQUISITION OF 
SERVICES SUBJECT TO THE SERVICE CONTRACT ACT OF 1965, AS 
AMENDED, DOES NOT EXCEED $2,500 (REF C).    
  
H.  OWNERSHIP OF DOD-CONSTRUCTED FACILITIES:  OWNERSHIP OF DOD-CONSTRUCTED 
FACILITIES SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE HOST NATION THROUGH THE COUNTRY 
TEAM.  NON-GOVERNMENTAL OR OTHER PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS MAY NOT RECEIVE 
TITLE TO A SCHOOL, CLINIC, OR OTHER BUILDING CONSTRUCTED AS A DOD HA PROJECT.  
SUCH ORGANIZATIONS MAY OPERATE IN DOD-CONSTRUCTED FACILITIES, BUT FORMAL 
OWNERSHIP OF THESE FACILITIES  MUST REMAIN WITH AN ENTITY OF THE HOST NATION 
GOVERNMENT. 
PROPOSALS MUST BE CLEAR IN THIS REGARD.   
  
5.  HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TRANSPORTATION GUIDANCE:  NGOS AND CHARITIES 
MAY REQUEST TRANSPORTATION OF THEIR PRIVATELY DONATED HUMANITARIAN 
MATERIEL THROUGH THE DENTON OR FUNDED TRANSPORTATION PROGRAMS.  THE 
DENTON PROGRAM IS A SPACE-AVAILABLE PROGRAM FOR PRIVATELY DONATED 
MATERIAL ONLY AND IS ADMINISTERED BY USAID.  THE FUNDED TRANSPORTATION 
PROGRAM PROVIDES TRANSPORTATION FOR CARGO THAT MEETS BASIC HUMANITARIAN 
NEEDS, APPLIES TO BOTH PRIVATE DONATIONS AS WELL AS USG MATERIEL (I.E., 
DISASTER RESPONSE, EP SHIPMENTS), AND IS FUNDED OUT OF OHDACA. 
INDEPENDENT COCOM FUNDING FOR TRANSPORTING SUCH MATERIEL FOR USE IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH HA PROJECTS IS NOT AUTHORIZED EXCEPT IN CASES WHERE A 
COMMANDER IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF A DISASTER IS TAKING STEPS TO 
SAVE LIVES.    
  
6. COMBATANT COMMANDERS? REQUESTS FOR LIMITED PERSONNEL SUPPORT FOR 
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THEIR ANNUAL BUDGET 
SUBMISSIONS.   
  
7.  POINT OF CONTACT:  OASD(GSA):  MICHAEL MCNERNEY, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL 
CAPACITY BUILDING (703) 697-0777, DSN 227-0777. 
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